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Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens:
The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence
Christopher A. Cotropia∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent quality in the United States is the subject of much recent
discussion.1 There is a general sentiment that many of the inventions
for which patents are issued and successfully enforced do not meet
the requirement of patentability. The existence and enforcement of
these patents hampers competition and, in the end, hurts the
consumer.2 Stories of patent holding companies harassing honest
businesses with invalid patents are becoming commonplace in the
popular press.3 The existence of these “trolls,”4 and the bad patents
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Intellectual Property Institute, University of Richmond
School of Law. I would like to thank Graeme Dinwoodie, Cynthia Ho, Tim Holbrook, Mark
Lemley, Greg Mandel, Joe Miller, Jonathan Nash, Rafael Pardo, Arti Rai, Matt Sag, Katherine
Strandburg, and the participants at the Spring 2006 Chicago Intellectual Property Colloquium
for their helpful comments and thoughts on an early draft of this Article.
1. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 34–35 (2004) (arguing that the patent system is broken and
improperly creates and enforces patent rights that are too strong); Joseph Farrell & Robert P.
Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent
Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
943, 945–46 (2004) (identifying problems with patent quality); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar
Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 995–99 (2004) (detailing problems with the United States
patent system that result in low patent quality); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The United States
Patent Reform Quagmire: A Balanced Proposal, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 735 (2005)
(book review).
2. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 1, at 992–94.
3. See, e.g., Michelle Kessler, Patent Lawsuits Hit Tech Titans, USA TODAY, Feb. 13,
2006, at B3 (detailing the recent rise of patent suits against large companies); Rachel Laing,
Down to Wire for Blackberry?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 24, 2006, at A1 (discussing the
patent infringement suit against Research-in-Motion that potentially could have caused all
Blackberry devices to shut down).
4. “Patent trolls” are companies or individuals who try to “game the system” by
obtaining patents and try to “capture not only the value of their inventions, but the value of
complementary assets and irreversible investments made by” others. Mark A. Lemley,
Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 630 (2005).
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they seek to enforce, suggests the United States patent system is not
working. In fact, the perceived desperate state of the patent system is
getting congressional attention, causing the most significant patent
reform bill since 1952 to be introduced in Congress this past
legislative session.5
The focus of much of the criticism is on a particular requirement
for patentability—nonobviousness.6 The nonobviousness requirement in patent law has been termed the “ultimate condition for
patentability.”7 It ensures that “even if an invention is new and
useful,” that invention represents a measurable technological advance
beyond what has already been done.8 Only those inventions warrant
patent protection. The requirement carries most of the burden of
maintaining a balance in patent law between providing an incentive
for inventions to be created while not protecting so many minor
inventions that protection becomes socially harmful.9 Most recent
commentary and criticism regarding nonobviousness focuses on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court
that exclusively handles appeals in patent cases.10 The main thrust of
this criticism is that the Federal Circuit has relaxed the
nonobviousness requirement, thereby allowing too much patent
protection and, as a result, harming innovation. The criticism is
directed at recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence and its alleged
modification of the nonobviousness standard.

5. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. Nonobviousness is also a common target for the popular press’s critiques of the
patent system, evidenced by the numerous articles that use the phrase “patently obvious” in
their titles. See, e.g., Reed Hundt, Patently Obvious, FORBES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 36.
7. See NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980).
8. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988).
9. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 6–7 (2003) (asserting that a “but for”
test instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper balance between patent
protection and competition).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000) (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate
authority over patent appeals). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (limiting the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction);
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 286–302 (2003) (explaining how the Holmes
decision disturbed the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction).
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Recent criticism includes two highly publicized reports—one by
the Federal Trade Commission in 2003 and another by the National
Research Council in 2004.11 In addition, the Federal Circuit’s
nonobviousness case law is the subject of a highly publicized case
pending before the Supreme Court—KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc.12 The Petitioner, KSR, is supported by intellectual
property law professors, economists, legal historians, many Fortune
500 technology companies, and the Solicitor General.13
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness jurisprudence has
been the subject of multiple academic articles asserting the court
improperly applies the doctrine.14
All of this criticism of the Federal Circuit’s case law focuses, in
one form or another, on the “suggestion test” part of the
nonobviousness analysis. The suggestion test requires a finding that
there was some suggestion before the invention’s creation to
combine or modify the prior art—things that have already been
done—in such a way as to make the claimed invention.15 The
suggestion test is meant to discern whether there already was a
suggestion to create what is claimed to be patentable, and thus,
patent protection was not needed to prompt the invention’s
creation.
The Federal Circuit is said to improperly limit the suggestion test
inquiry. The court requires a suggestion to come from the prior art
itself. Other commonly accepted sources of undocumented

11. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9; COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON. ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004).
12. 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2965 (2006) (granting certiorari).
13. See, e.g., Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL
2452369 [hereinafter Brief of IP Professors]; Brief of Economists and Legal Historians as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL
2452359; Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Sys. Inc. et al. in Support of Reversal, KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452365 [hereinafter Cisco
Brief]; Brief for Amici Curiae Time Warner Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, No.
04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452363; Brief of Intel Corp. & Micron Tech., Inc.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006
WL 2453606; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Teleflex,
No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2453601s.
14. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004).
15. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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suggestions, such as the common knowledge of those skilled in the
relevant technology or the nature of the problem the invention is
solving, are ignored. This “narrow” suggestion test focuses solely on
the prior art. Commentators contend that the narrow suggestion test
relaxes the nonobviousness requirement because it limits the grounds
upon which a suggestion can be found. As a result, the narrow
suggestion test allows obvious inventions to be improperly found
nonobvious and receive patent protection. Critics, therefore, call for
a full, broader application of the suggestion test that considers other
factual bases for suggestion—a “broad” suggestion test. One should
be allowed to rely on the knowledge in the art or the nature of the
problem being solved—undocumented suggestions—to render an
invention obvious.
This Article tests the validity of this criticism and finds that the
Federal Circuit has not narrowed the suggestion test. By taking a
novel look at the jurisprudence, this Article concludes that the court
has instead adopted an evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test.
Those cases where it appears the court is focusing only on the prior
art are actually instances where the court is exercising an evidentiary
aspect of the suggestion test. The suggestion test’s “rule of
evidence” excludes undocumented evidence of suggestion that does
not contain the requisite detail and analysis. This rule of evidence is
tailored to adjust the level of detail and analysis required to
correspond to the complexity of the technology at issue. As a result,
the suggestion test’s rule of evidence helps to reduce overvaluation
of suggestion evidence and the resulting, incorrect obviousness
determinations. However, the rule may produce some erroneous
nonobviousness determinations of its own, particularly at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), and thus should be
relaxed in this context. Finally, this use of an evidentiary lens to look
at, and evaluate, patent doctrine has application in patent law far
beyond nonobviousness and the suggestion test.
This Article reaches these conclusions in the following manner. It
first focuses on the Federal Circuit’s recent usage of the suggestion
test.16 Specifically, a descriptive study will concentrate on recent
Federal Circuit cases addressing nonobviousness.17 The specific focus

16. The particulars of the descriptive study are detailed in Part IV of this Article. See
infra Part IV and notes 101–04.
17. Id.
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of the descriptive inquiry will be the contours of the suggestion test
the court uses.
The initial results of this study are mixed. There are clearly cases
where the court ignores all grounds for suggestion other than prior
art. Cases such as Teleflex, which is currently pending before the
Supreme Court, provide good examples of the court apparently
using a narrow suggestion test.18 However, just as many cases are
found where the court uses the traditional, broad suggestion test.
For example, in Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter,
Inc., the court based its finding of suggestion on knowledge in the
art and the nature of the problem being solved.19 Both narrow and
broad suggestion test cases can be found in appeals from patent
infringement decisions by district courts and appeals from final
rejections of patent applications by the USPTO.
As a result of this initial finding, this Article then takes a second
look at this apparent conflict in the substantive law of the suggestion
test.20 Instead of focusing on whether the narrow suggestion test is
the result of a change in substantive law, this Article asks whether the
results in those cases are the product of an evidentiary-like rule. That
is, does the suggestion test also have an evidentiary component?
In order to test this hypothesis, this Article compares the
undocumented evidence of suggestion the Federal Circuit accepts
and rejects in the narrow and broad suggestion test cases. From this
comparison, a clear “rule of evidence” emerges.21 The Federal
Circuit has never deviated from the substance of the traditional,
broad suggestion test, as critics argue. Instead, the court has given
the suggestion test an evidentiary-like aspect that excludes certain
types of undocumented suggestion evidence. What are thought by
critics to be instances where the court would accept only prior art as
evidence of suggestion are really situations where the undocumented
suggestion evidence did not meet the suggestion test’s rule of
evidence. That undocumented suggestion evidence was therefore not
considered, leaving only prior art for consideration.
18. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
19. 411 F.3d 1332, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20. See infra Part V.
21. The phrase “rule of evidence” is used as shorthand to emphasize the evidentiary-like
features of the aspect of the suggestion test being discussed. The phrase is not used to indicate
that this part of the suggestion test behaves in every way like a true rule of evidence. See infra
note 197.
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The suggestion test’s rule of evidence requires testimony on
undocumented suggestions to be both detailed and thorough in its
analysis. The level of detail and analysis required varies with the level
of technological complexity of the invention at issue. The more
complex the invention, the greater detail and analysis needed for the
undocumented suggestion evidence to be “admissible.” As the
sophistication of the invention decreases, so do the evidentiary
requirements.
Once the suggestion test’s rule of evidence is articulated, this
Article performs a normative analysis of the rule.22 In particular, the
rule is evaluated to see if it furthers the substantive goals of the
nonobviousness doctrine. This analysis is performed by looking at
the rule under evidence theory. Specifically, the rule is evaluated to
see if it prevents overvaluation of undocumented suggestion
evidence. The rule does prevent overvaluation by both mitigating the
effects of hindsight bias and increasing the reliability of admitted
testimony on suggestion. By mitigating overvaluation, the rule
reduces the number of erroneous findings of obviousness (Type I
errors).23
However, the rule does nothing to reduce incorrect conclusions
of nonobviousness (Type II errors).24 The overvaluation the rule
prevents only creates improper conclusions of suggestion, and thus
obviousness, failing to work in the other direction. Furthermore, the
rule may introduce Type II errors of its own by hampering one’s
ability to prove obviousness by reducing the universe of evidence
that can be used to establish an undocumented suggestion.
However, the likelihood of Type II errors is diminished by the
tailoring the rule performs, ensuring that in those instances where
concern of an obvious patent issuing are at their highest, the
evidentiary requirement for an undocumented suggestion is at its
lowest. Still, a lessening of the evidentiary standard in the USPTO
setting would further minimize the possibility of Type II errors
without hampering the rule’s ability to prevent Type I errors.
This Article concludes by identifying other areas of patent law
that may benefit from a similar, evidentiary focused analysis. Two
22. See infra Part VI.
23. Type I errors are false-positives, which, in the context of this Article, are incorrect
conclusions of obviousness. Cf. infra note 271.
24. Type II errors are false-negatives, which, in the context of this Article, are incorrect
conclusions of nonobviousness. Cf. infra note 271.
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specific areas are discussed: claim interpretation and inventorship.
Both areas have evidentiary-like rules that can be better described
and analyzed through an evidentiary lens. This Article’s focus on
evidence law not only helps inform and further the nonobviousness
discussion, it can also assist in further study of patent law in general.
II. NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE “SUGGESTION TEST”
In order to obtain a patent in the United States or successfully
enforce a patent in district court, the patent must claim an invention
that meets the patentability requirements.25 The claimed invention
must be directed towards patentable subject matter26 and be useful
and novel.27 The patent must also describe the claimed invention and
enable those of ordinary skill in the relevant technology to practice
the invention.28 Finally, the claimed invention must be nonobvious.29
The final requirement for patentability—nonobviousness—is the
focus of this Article.
A. Purpose of the Nonobviousness Requirement
At the core of the United States patent system is the right to
exclude. With patent protection comes the ability to exclude others
from making and using a protected invention.30 One of the major
concerns such protection presents is the “underuse of the invention
due to patent monopolies.”31 The power of exclusion a patent gives
its owner can lead to “higher prices for and underutilization of the
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000) (noting that the USPTO will examine patent
applications to see if the “applicant is entitled to a patent under the law”); id. § 282 (noting
that invalidity is a defense to a patent infringement action); Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality
and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 225–30 (2004) (detailing the
requirements for patentability).
26. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (noting that Congress intended
for patent protection to extend to statutory subject matter that included “anything under the
sun that is made by man” (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6
(1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.)).
27. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (setting forth the utility and novelty requirements).
28. See id. § 112 (setting forth the written description and enablement requirements).
The patent must also describe the best method of practicing the invention known to the
inventor at the time of the patent’s filing. See id.
29. See id. § 103 (setting forth the nonobviousness requirement).
30. See id. § 271(a).
31. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 (1990) (detailing the downside to patent protection and
utilizing economic tools to analyze the pros and cons of patent protection).
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patented process or product during the period of exclusion.”32
Exclusion, therefore, introduces certain social costs that are not
present when patent protection is absent. These “costs that arise ex
post from exclusion” are acceptable if the resulting benefits from the
ex ante incentives of patent protection prove to be greater.33 Patent
protection becomes cost beneficial in situations where it is needed to
prompt an invention’s creation and the invention it induces is of a
level of social value that exceeds the costs associated with exclusion.
The nonobviousness requirement is meant to maintain the
optimal balance between the benefits and harms of patent
protection.34 An invention must be new and useful to qualify for
patent protection.35 But nonobviousness, the “final gatekeeper of the
patent system,”36 requires more—the invention must also be “a
significant enough technical advance to merit the award of a
patent.”37 The requirement attempts to measure the “technical
accomplishment reflected in an invention,” and in turn make sure
that patents cover subject matter that is more than a mere “trivial
step forward in the art.”38
The nonobviousness requirement for patentability also “ask[s]
whether an invention would likely emerge in roughly the same time
frame—that is, without significant delay—‘but for’ the prospect of
the patent.”39 Patents should be granted only for those inventions
that would have not been created but for the incentive of patent
protection. The nonobviousness doctrine implements this “but for”
test by ensuring that patent protection is not given to inventions in

32. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2002).
33. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A
Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 41 (2004).
34. Because of this aspect of the requirement, it has been termed the “ultimate
condition of patentability.” See NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF
PATENTABILITY, supra note 7.
35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102.
36. Merges, supra note 8, at 812.
37. ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 644 (3d ed. 2002); Merges, supra note 8, at 812 (“[The] requirement asks
whether an invention is a big enough technical advance.”).
38. Merges, supra note 8, at 812 (emphasis omitted).
39. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 6–7 (asserting that this “but for” test
instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper balance between patent
protection and competition).
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those instances where “others would have developed the idea even
without the incentive of a patent.”40
Without the nonobviousness requirement, the patent system
would introduce more social harm than good. First, if merely trivial
technological advances were patentable, the system would provide
incentives for the creation of inventions that arguably produce little
to no social value. This would skew the patent system’s incentive
structure—focusing would-be inventors on minor developments as
opposed to significant technological advances. In turn, these
“economically insignificant patents” would clog the inventive
pathways to highly beneficial technological advances.41 Exclusive
control over these minor developments would act as roadblocks,
creating disincentives to future inventors. Many patents on small
technical advances make it extremely difficult and “expensive to
search and to license” these patents in order to produce further
innovations.42 These high costs will either prevent the public from
enjoying certain technologies altogether because they will never be
commercialized, or be passed along to the public in the form of
higher prices.
Second, even if an invention reaches the requisite level of
technological merit, conditions may be such that the invention
would have been created and disseminated in the absence of patent
protection. In such a situation, providing exclusivity over subject
matter that fails the “but for” test introduces the costs of exclusivity
when such costs did not need to be imposed. Thus, “eliminating the
nonobviousness requirement may impose some social loss by
granting patents to innovations that would have been discovered and
disclosed even without the inducement of a patent.”43
Nonobviousness, therefore, represents a substantial and
significant barrier to protection under the United States patent
system.44 The doctrine plays a central role in deciding which

40. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 37, at 646; see also Lunney, supra note 33, at 50–51.
41. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 37, at 646–47; see also Christopher A. Cotropia,
“After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151,
178–85 (2005) (detailing how patent protection can deter would be follow-on inventors).
42. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 3 (quoting MERGES & DUFFY, supra
note 37, at 647).
43. Lunney, supra note 33, at 38.
44. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
363, 370 (2001).

1525

COTROPIA.MRO.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/20/2007 1:08:43 PM

[2006

inventions are patentable—and therefore get a limited period of
exclusivity—and those that get no protection. Its effective and
proper enforcement is crucial to maintaining the social cost-benefit
balance the patent system attempts to implement.
Standing in the way of such proper implementation is the
difficulty of articulating the doctrine for usage by the courts, the
USPTO, patentees, and other patent observers.45 What standard or
rule can ensure that both of the determinations already discussed—
that an invention reaches a particular level of technical advancement
and that the invention would not have been created but for the
incentives of the system—are properly and easily made by these
patent players? Articulating the goals of the doctrine is fairly easy.
Crafting a requirement to effectuate these goals is much more
difficult.
B. Modern Implementation of the Nonobviousness Requirement
There is a significant amount of important history leading up to
the creation of the modern nonobviousness requirement.46 For the
purposes of this Article, however, the discussion will begin with the
codification of the nonobviousness requirement at 35 U.S.C. § 103
by the 1952 Patent Act.47 This statute was meant to “structure
judicial thinking about obviousness” and place the requirement on
“more solid footing.”48 The statutory test for nonobviousness
indicates that
[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.49

45. The term “observers” is borrowed from Clarisa Long’s work in the patent area. See
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (2004).
The term “observer” is meant to capture all of those who do not own patents but “need to
learn and comprehend the boundaries and qualities” of patents for various reasons. Id.
46. A short summary can be found in one of Professor Robert Merges’s works on the
subject. See Merges, supra note 8, at 812–16 (noting the evolution from a highly abstract “test
of invention” to the “formal,” “structure[d]” approach of 35 U.S.C. § 103).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
48. Merges, supra note 8, at 813.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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The Supreme Court addressed this codified nonobviousness test
in Graham v. John Deere Co.50 In Graham, the Supreme Court noted
that § 103 “lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.”51 The
Supreme Court explicitly articulated three such inquires: (1)
identifying the “scope and content of the prior art,” (2) determining
the “differences between the prior art and the claims,” and (3)
ascertaining “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”52 The
Court then indicated that “[a]gainst this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined.”53 The Supreme Court also acknowledged that
secondary factors, that is, objective factors such as the commercial
success of the invention, could also be properly considered in making
the obviousness determination.54
In some respects, the rule of law set forth in Graham is pretty
clear. The opinion explicitly spells out the three initial steps to any
nonobviousness analysis. In addition, the usage of secondary
considerations as indicia of nonobviousness is clearly noted. But, the
decision leaves a significant gap—how does a decision-maker go
from the result of the three initial factual inquiries to the ultimate
conclusion of nonobviousness or obviousness?55 The Supreme
Court’s opinion may have even foreshadowed the presence of this
gap by noting that, even with the guidance from its opinion,
determinations of obviousness would be difficult.56 This gap has
been, and still is, at the center of any issue of nonobviousness
considered by courts, the USPTO, patentees, and other patent
observers.

50. 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966).
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 17–18. “These secondary considerations include evidence of commercial
success, fulfillment of a long-felt but unsolved need, licensing to potential competitors,
copying by an infringer, progress of the patent application through the Patent and Trademark
Office, near-simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, and professional
approval by experts in the field.” Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary
Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L.
REV. 357, 366 (1987).
55. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 9 & n.49 (citing Professor John
Duffy who testified that the Graham Factors “sort of leave off at the very point you think the
analysis should start”).
56. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
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The Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, established a test to fill this gap—the
“suggestion test.”57 Once the three initial inquiries articulated in
Graham are made, Federal Circuit case law requires a showing that
there is some “suggestion, teaching, or motivation” that would have
led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine or change the
relevant art teachings to make the patented invention.58 The
suggestion test is a required component of any nonobviousness
analysis in patent infringement litigation and part of the prima facie
case of obviousness during patent examination.59 This suggestion test
provides an analytical tool to determine when the jump can properly
be made from defining the relevant prior art, the skill in the art, and
differences between the art and the invention to the ultimate
conclusion of obviousness.
The suggestion test is formulated to further the goals of the
nonobviousness requirement.60 First, it attempts to ensure a certain
level of technological advancement from that already known in the
relevant field of art. If the elements of the invention existed prior to
the invention and a motivation or suggestion to use these elements
to make the invention was already present, the actual creation of the
invention is not a significant enough development to warrant patent
protection. The suggestion test also mimics the “but for” analysis
commonly associated with the nonobviousness inquiry. The
suggestion test asks whether a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have, at the time of the invention, been motivated to combine

57. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[1][e] (Supp. 2005).
58. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 1998). While
suggestion is usually discussed in the context of a suggestion to combine one or more prior art
teachings, a suggestion may also be to simply modify a single prior art reference. See Graham,
383 U.S. at 21–26 (finding a plow design obvious in light of a single piece of prior art); Merck
& Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that a single prior
art reference is sufficient to render the innovation obvious).
59. See In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002); C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at
1351–52.
60. The suggestion test is not the only part of the nonobviousness inquiry that is meant
to further the goals of the doctrine. For example, the secondary considerations are arguably
tailored to further the same goals targeted by the suggestion test. See, e.g., Richard L. Robbins,
Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 1169, 1172–83 (1964). Others have argued that certain secondary considerations, such
as commercial success, are “a poor indicator of patentability.” Merges, supra note 8, at 838–
59; see also Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 293, 330–35 (1966).
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what was already known—the prior art teachings—in the same
manner as the invention at issue. In other words, when such a
suggestion or motivation was present before the invention, one can
conclude that there was no, or very little, need for an incentive from
the patent system to spark the creation of the invention. With little
to no barrier to the invention’s creation due to the existence of a
motivation or suggestion, the incentive of patent protection is not
needed. In this environment, if the invention has some social value,
the rents available, however minimal, from tangible property rights
alone will likely be enough to prompt the invention’s creation.61 The
suggestion test, along with the other parts of the Graham analysis,
becomes a proxy for ensuring that the “but for” assumption to
patent protection is implemented.
The suggestion test is also used to avoid “hindsight bias” in the
nonobviousness analysis by requiring any finding of suggestion be
grounded in specific factual proof. The threat of a nonobvious
invention being found to be obvious after it exists, particularly after
the fact finder has studied it, is quite high. The nonobviousness
analysis is inherently ex post because it necessarily takes place after
the invention has already been created, but the question asked (Was
the invention obvious at the time the invention was made?) is asked
ex ante. In applying the test, the “decision-maker must step
backward in time to a moment when the invention was unknown” to
determine nonobviousness.62 When making determinations from this
perspective, the patented invention should not act as a blueprint as
to how to combine different teachings in the prior art together to
invalidate the invention. The nonobviousness doctrine, therefore,
asks the decision-makers to ignore what they have already learned.63
The problem is that “[h]umans are cognitively incapable of
ignoring what they have learned.”64 Armed with the knowledge of
the patented invention, the skilled artisan's selection and
combination of the prior art to make the claimed invention becomes

61. Lunney, supra note 33, at 39 (noting how tangible property rights provide some
vehicle for the recapture of sunk costs).
62. Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational 6 (1st Annual Conference on Empirical legal studies
paper, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=871684 (studying whether hindsight bias truly effects
patent decisions).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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much easier to comprehend. The conceptualization of the
invention’s creation is prompted by the invention’s current existence.
This situation creates a hindsight bias—making an invention more
likely to appear obvious to a decision-maker.
In order for the nonobviousness analysis to be performed
properly and for the goals of the doctrine to stay true, the doctrine
must take hindsight bias into account. The suggestion test is meant
to de-bias the decision-maker.65 The suggestion test requires the
decision-maker to ground any conclusion she may have initially
arising from hindsight bias in specific proof. “[T]he best defense
against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based
obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a
showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art
references.”66 Without the de-biasing effects of the suggestion test,
most inventions would be found obvious because all of the elements
of those inventions are most likely found in the prior art and the
invention itself will act as a road map for how these pieces of prior
art can be put together. So the suggestion test not only furthers the
main policies behind the nonobviousness requirement, but it also
reduces the likelihood that the invention itself will be used against
the inventor, biasing the decision-maker, via hindsight, into
concluding that the invention is obvious.
While the purposes of the suggestion test are rather easily
understood, where such suggestions can be legitimately found is
trickier. The Federal Circuit, in almost all of its nonobviousness
opinions, recites three sources from which a suggestion may be
found: (a) the prior art references themselves, (b) the knowledge of
those of ordinary skill in the art, and (c) the nature of the problem to
be solved.67 The first source, prior art references, is defined by statute
and includes those technical journals, articles, and physical devices in
existence at the time of the invention’s creation.68 Basically, this first
65. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To
prevent hindsight invalidation of patent claims, the law requires some ‘teaching, suggestion or
reason’ to combine cited references.” (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
66. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds
by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
67. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (setting forth categories of prior art). The specific
contours of “prior art” in patent law are a bit more nuanced than simply what was documented
before the invention’s creation. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (defining a category of prior art that may
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source includes suggestions stemming from the knowledge that was
documented at the time of the invention.69 The second and third
sources focus on the general knowledge of, or interpretation of the
problem being solved by, a person skilled in the relevant
technological field at the time of the invention. These latter
categories include suggestions coming from information that was
undocumented at the time of the invention.70
III. CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S NONOBVIOUSNESS
JURISPRUDENCE
Most of the recent criticism surrounding the nonobviousness
doctrine and the Federal Circuit centers on the suggestion test.71
Critics assert that the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the
suggestion test has “reduce[d] the size of the step required for
patentability—that is, reducing the rigor of the nonobviousness
standard.”72 While some critics have called for the abolishment of the
suggestion test altogether,73 others assert that the Federal Circuit
improperly applies a “narrow” suggestion test by recognizing a
suggestion or motivation to combine from only prior art
references.74 The court should, instead, apply a “broad” suggestion

be dated after the invention’s creation, but more than one year before the filing date of the
invention’s patent application); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401–
04 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that most subsections of § 102 qualify as prior art for
consideration in a nonobviousness analysis under § 103).
69. This Article will refer to this first category as “documented suggestions.”
70. This Article will refer to these latter two categories, collectively, as “undocumented
suggestions.”
71. Criticism also focuses on the use of “commercial success” as an objective indicator
of nonobviousness. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 15–19 (2003).
Discussion of secondary considerations and the commercial success indicia are beyond the
scope of this Article.
72. Id. at 8.
73. See, e.g., Cisco Brief, supra note 13, at 10–11. This Article will focus on the assertion
that the Federal Circuit employs a narrow suggestion test and, thus, will not discuss the
propriety of the abolishment or replacement of even the broad suggestion test. However, the
normative discussion in Part VI of this Article, infra, necessarily has some application to the
broader nonobviousness debate.
74. As will be explained in more detail below, critics may not identify a specific change
to the suggestion test, just that the complete nonobviousness analysis must be based on the
prior art and not other, undocumented information. See, e.g., Brief of IP Professors, supra note
13, at 10–13 (“As applied in this case, the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art is
used to help determine the scope and content of the applicable prior art, but there appears to
be no room for the application of routine problem-solving skill. The nature of the problem
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test that would allow for the consideration of both documented and
undocumented suggestions in the search for a suggestion to
combine.75 The usage of a narrow suggestion test produces a less
rigorous nonobviousness standard, which, in turn, results in more
obvious patents being issued and successfully enforced.76 Such a
situation upsets the specific incentives the nonobviousness doctrine is
meant to preserve and, instead, introduces social costs the patent
system is supposed to avoid.
Two recent reports on the United States patent system examined
the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the suggestion test. The first
is a 2003 report on patent law and competition written by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC focused, in part, on the
Federal Circuit’s use of the suggestion test when determining
nonobviousness.77 The FTC observed from the hearings it held that
while the Federal Circuit articulates three sources from which a
suggestion can arise, the “feel of the case law” is that the court
recognizes suggestions only from the prior art and not the two other
categories.78 Motivations must come from literal readings of the
references, not from the knowledge in the art or the nature of the
problem being solved.79 This narrowing of the suggestion test, the
FTC concluded, is evidenced in both the Federal Circuit’s handling
of appeals from patent infringement cases and decisions by the
USPTO.80 The FTC report particularly noted that the Federal
similarly serves only to motivate a search for references addressing the specific problem at
hand.”).
75. This distinction between a broad and a narrow suggestion test may also be
articulated as the difference between an explicit and implicit suggestion to combine. Such
labels cannot be considered equivalent for the purposes of this Article. Broad versus narrow
foci on where a suggestion may be found—either in just the prior art or also in the skill in the
art or the nature of the problem. Explicit versus implicit speaks to how the suggestion appears
in a given source, not a definition of the source itself. See, e.g., Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l
Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (articulating the suggestion test as
requiring either an “explicit or implicit teaching[]” found within any of the three commonly
recited sources for a suggestion).
76. This situation will be referenced in Part VI of this Article, infra, as a “Type II
error”—a false finding of an invention’s nonobviousness. See infra note 271.
77. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4.
78. Id. at 12 (quoting testimony from Professor John Duffy).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 10–12 (“Criticisms of recent opinions focus on the rigorous manner in which
the Federal Circuit has applied the suggestion test, rather than the totality of the court’s
language.”).
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Circuit requires “the [USPTO] to apply only specific and definitive
art references with clear motivation of how to combine those
references, and only that will suffice for this obviousness
determination.”81
The FTC concluded that this narrow suggestion test “rais[ed]
the bar for finding obviousness” and, in turn, “rais[ed] competitive
concerns.”82 By excluding skill in the art from the suggestion test
analysis, the Federal Circuit fails to find invalid those inventions that
fail the “but for” analysis—that would have been produced
regardless of the incentive of patent protection. The FTC
determined that by ignoring suggestions from the skill in the art or
the nature of the problem solved, the Federal Circuit ignores
evidence that could clearly suggest the invention is inevitably
forthcoming and that patent protection—and the exclusivity that
comes along with it—is not needed.83 A relaxed nonobviousness
standard, in turn, creates “serious clutter problems and issues
involving market power maintenance and extension.”84 The FTC
recommended that the suggestion test include those undocumented
suggestions, such as from the knowledge in the art or the nature of
the problem being solved.85 Thus, the FTC recommended the usage
of a broad suggestion test to put the nonobviousness requirement in
line with its intended purpose—providing patent protection where it
is warranted and socially beneficial.
The FTC’s report was followed by a 2004 report on the United
States patent system by the National Research Council (NRC).86 The
report included seven recommendations for the current patent
system, one of which was to “reinvigorate the non-obviousness
standard.”87 The NRC’s discussion of this recommendation focused
on the current nonobviousness requirement as applied in two
81. Id. (quoting the testimony of former PTO director Q. Todd Dickinson).
82. Id. at 13. Noting how only looking at prior art references for suggestion or
motivation operates as a “one-way ratchet: it can help confirm obviousness, but it does not
necessarily identify nonobviousness.” Id. at 14.
83. Id. at 13–14.
84. Id. at 9. The FTC also noted that by reading the person having ordinary skill in the
art out of the analysis, the Federal Circuit may be ignoring the statutory mandate of § 103. Id.
at 14 (noting that “[s]ome applications of the suggestion test, however, appear almost to have
read PHOSITA out of the statute”).
85. Id. at 15.
86. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).
87. Id. at 87–95.
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particular contexts: business method and gene sequence-related
inventions.88
In the business method section of the report, the NRC voiced
concern that the suggestion test, in its current form, improperly
“assume[s] that the USPTO will have access to the state of the art at
the time the invention at issue was made.”89 In the business method
area, published literature will unlikely fully describe the common
knowledge or state of the art at a particular time.90 Thus, the
USPTO cannot readily establish a prima facie case of obviousness
during examination if it must find suggestion in a prior art reference
because most of the skill in the business method art is not embodied
in such references. The report also noted that the USPTO has
limited mechanisms through which it can obtain testimony to
establish that knowledge in the art is not found in publications.91
Thus, the NRC’s report criticized the Federal Circuit for using a
narrow suggestion test.
These concerns regarding the Federal Circuit’s alleged usage of a
narrow suggestion test do not end with these two recent reports.
Contemporary scholarship has concluded that the Federal Circuit
requires the suggestion to come from a prior art reference. Professor
Rebecca Eisenberg asserts that the court’s current approach
“sidelines” the person having ordinary skill in the art in the
nonobviousness analysis.92 Eisenberg concludes that the court “all
but ignor[es] the statutory directive that judgments of
nonobviousness be made from [the perspective of the person having
ordinary skill in the art].”93 Professor Arti Rai comes to a similar
88. Id. The focus here will be on the NRC’s discussion of business-method patents and
nonobviousness. The NRC’s report on nonobviousness and gene sequence-related inventions
focuses on the Federal Circuit’s requirement that a gene sequence invention is “only obvious
and unpatentable when the obvious route to try is coupled with a ‘reasonable expectation of
success.’” Id. at 91–92 (focusing on the Federal Circuit’s decisions in In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781
(Fed. Cir. 1993) and In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). This part of the report does
not focus on the court’s use of the suggestion test and therefore is not directly relevant to this
Article.
89. Id. at 88.
90. Id. at 88–89. The NRC’s report further notes that even when business method
information is published, it is mostly likely that “non-obvious information” is published. Id. at
90.
91. Id. at 89–90. The FTC’s report concurs with this analysis. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 40.
92. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 888.
93. Id.
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conclusion, emphasizing how the court’s application of the narrow
suggestion test severely limits the USPTO’s review of patent
applications.94 Rai contends that the USPTO cannot rely upon its
knowledge of the skill in the art, hampering a significant avenue by
which it can establish a prima facie case of obviousness.95
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on the suggestion test is also
the subject of a pending case before the Supreme Court. In KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court will review the
Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness case law and, more specifically, its
usage of the suggestion test.96 All of the amicus briefs filed in
support of KSR conclude that the current Federal Circuit case law
implements too lax of a nonobviousness requirement. Most of the
briefs specifically focus on the Federal Circuit’s implementation of
the suggestion test and argue that the test, as implemented, ignores
any knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.97 The
court requires that the nonobviousness analysis focus solely on the
prior art and not on undocumented information known at the time
of the invention.98 The briefs conclude that the current suggestion
test and low standard for nonobviousness result in bad patent policy
and harm to innovation.99 Based on the briefing and the certified
question, the Supreme Court will look at the suggestion test in
general, and specifically at whether the test ignores undocumented
evidence of obviousness.100
These recent critiques of Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness
jurisprudence are quite numerous and fairly harsh. A significant
number of them rest on a basic initial assumption—the Federal
Circuit employs a narrow suggestion test, limiting the grounds for

94. Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 907, 912–17 (2004).
95. Id.
96. See Cisco Brief, supra note 13; Brief of IP Professors, supra note 13; Brief of the
Progress & Freedom Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452361. The underlying
Federal Circuit opinion, Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir.
2005), will be discussed in detail in Part IV.A.1, infra, of this Article. The arguments made in
these briefs concerning Supreme Court case law and the statutory language of § 103, while
part of the nonobviousness debate, fall beyond the scope of this Article.
97. See, e.g., Brief of IP Professors, supra note 13, at 10–16.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., id. at 23–25.
100. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2965 (2006).
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suggestion to the content of prior art references. This inflexible
application of the test is employed in both the review of patent
infringement cases and opinions of the USPTO. This narrow
suggestion test, the argument continues, creates a relaxed
nonobviousness standard allowing technically obvious inventions to
be deemed patentable and successfully enforced. Such a result upsets
the balance between innovation and competition that the
nonobviousness doctrine is tasked with maintaining.
IV. EXAMINATION OF RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINIONS USING
THE SUGGESTION TEST
The first step in understanding the Federal Circuit’s recent usage
of the suggestion test is to find the answer to a purely descriptive
question. What are the exact contours of the suggestion test the
court is employing? This question tests the validity of the initial
assumption of recent criticism—that the court uses a narrow
suggestion test and focuses only on documented suggestions.
To test this assumption, this Part reports the results of a
descriptive study that looked at suggestion test jurisprudence over a
three-year period.101 This study examined all written decisions of the
Federal Circuit including a determination on the issue of
nonobviousness.102 For the three-year period, sixty-nine opinions,
considering ninety-two patents, made a determination on the issue
of nonobviousness.103

101. The exact three year period is from August 31, 2002 to September 1, 2005.
102. The cases were obtained by searching the Lexis Federal Circuit database over the
defined three year period for cases that included the terms “(patent and infring!)” to gather
appeals from patent infringement cases and the term “patent” in the “In re” cases to gather
appeals from the USPTO. From this database of cases, those cases in which the court affirmed,
reversed, or vacated a final decision on nonobviousness were considered.
Summary affirmances, “Rule 36” cases, were not included in the population because
the specific basis for affirmance, and thus the court’s usage of the suggestion test, could not be
discerned. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (“[The] court may enter a judgment of affirmance without
opinion, citing this rule, when it determines . . . an opinion would have no precedential
value.”). In addition, only those decisions involving utility patents, as opposed to design or
plant patents, were included. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164, 171–173 (2000) (identifying patents
for plants and designs).
103. Since this Article is focused on those specific cases that provide insight into the full
contours of the suggestion test, only those cases will be cited specifically. However, the
complete results of this study are on file with the author and available upon request.
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Of this population of sixty-nine opinions, only twelve cases
provide insight into the full contours of the suggestion test.104 These
are cases where the court discusses the suggestion test in the context
of both documented and undocumented suggestions. The other
opinions include twenty where the court never discussed the
suggestion test and thirty-seven where the court was confronted with
only prior art-based suggestion evidence.105 The focus of this Part is,
therefore, on the twelve cases that provide some insight into the
descriptive question at hand.
A. Federal Circuit Opinions Using the Narrow Suggestion Test
The focus is initially on cases where the narrow suggestion test is
apparently used.106 This discussion includes Federal Circuit opinions
reviewing appeals from both patent infringement decisions by district
courts and decisions by the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (the “Board”) affirming final rejections of patent
applications.

104. See In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Princeton Biochems., Inc. v.
Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex,
Inc., 407 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); ISCO Int’l, Inc. v. Conductus, Inc., 123 F. App’x 974
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l, Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re
Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Med.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Nylen, 97 F. App’x 293 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ruiz v.
A.B. Chance, 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir.
2002); N. Am. Oil Co. v. Star Brite Dist., Inc., 46 F. App’x 629 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Novo
Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
105. This later category of thirty-seven cases did not force the Federal Circuit to choose
between the broad and narrow suggestion tests because the litigants only relied on prior art to
establish a motivation to combine.
While these opinions do not give information on the contours of the court’s
suggestion test, they may provide insight into what litigants perceive to be the suggestion test
the court employs—a narrow suggestion test. By relying on only prior art, the litigants may be
signaling that they do not believe the court will accept anything else to establish a suggestion
to combine. For anyone reading the court’s opinions, such a belief is unlikely because, as will
be demonstrated below, the Federal Circuit on a number of occasions over the three-year
period found a suggestion to combine based on undocumented suggestion evidence.
106. There are four such opinions. See Teleflex, 119 F. App’x 282; Beasley, 117 F. App’x
739; Cardiac Pacemakers, 381 F.3d 1371; Huston, 308 F.3d 1267. For purposes of brevity,
and to avoid redundancy, the discussion will detail the court’s analysis in the first three
opinions.
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1. Appeals from patent infringement cases
Any discussion of the narrow suggestion test must start with the
decision that is currently under review by the Supreme Court,
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International Co.107 Teleflex sued KSR alleging
infringement of its patent directed to an adjustable pedal assembly
for use with electronic throttle control in automobiles.108 In due
course, the district granted KSR summary judgment of invalidity,
concluding that the patent was obvious.109
The Federal Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, vacated the
summary judgment of obviousness.110 The court based its decision,
in part, on the conclusion that the district court erred as a matter of
law.111 The error was in the district court’s reliance on the nature of
the problem being solved to establish the necessary suggestion to
combine.112 The Federal Circuit recited the three bases for
establishing a motivation to combine—articulating the broad
suggestion test.113 The court then, however, indicated that in order
to support a finding of obviousness, the prior art references must
“address the precise problem that the patentee was trying to
solve.”114 Here, the prior art was not directed at solving the same
problem as Teleflex’s patent—designing a “smaller, less complex,
and less expensive electronic pedal assembly.”115 Instead, the art
either addressed different problems—solving the “constant ratio
problem” or “reducing wire chafing”—or suffered from the problem
Teleflex’s patent solves.116
Thus, while recognizing that suggestion can come from outside
the prior art references, the court still required the suggestion, in this

107. 119 F. App’x 282.
108. Id. at 283–84. The relevant patent is U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 (filed Aug. 22,
2000). Specifically, it asserted claim 4 of the patent describing an assembly where the
electronic control is mounted to the support bracket of the assembly so as to avoid movement
of the electronic control when the pedal’s position is adjusted. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 284.
109. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 284.
110. Id. at 283.
111. Id. (“[T]he district court’s analysis applied an incomplete teaching-suggestionmotivation test.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 288–89.
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case, to have some basis in the references themselves.117 A suggestion
established from the nature of the problem being solved needed to
have some grounding in the prior art—the art needed to address the
problem. Failure to establish such grounding in the art itself was a
substantive error in the law—an improper implementation of the
suggestion test.118 The court appears to conflate the nature of the
problem category for a motivation to combine with the prior art
category, substantively narrowing the suggestion test. The Teleflex
case, therefore, can be read as implementing the narrow suggestion
test.
The court’s opinion in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Medical, Inc. provides another arguable example of the narrow
suggestion test.119 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. (“CPI”) sued St. Jude
Medical, Inc. (“St. Jude”) alleging infringement of its patents
covering implantable cardiac defibrillators.120 The case was tried
before a jury, which found that St. Jude had infringed one of the
asserted patents and that the patent was valid.121 The district court
granted, in part, St. Jude’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
(“JMOL”), finding the infringed patent’s asserted claims obvious.122
The Federal Circuit, on appeal, vacated the district court’s
JMOL and reinstated the jury’s verdict of nonobviousness.123 In
discussing the evidence presented to the jury, the Federal Circuit’s
opinion focused on what suggestion or motivation came from the
prior art. First, the court dismissed the “recognition of the problem”
as a basis for finding the infringed patent obvious in this case.124 The
court concluded that the evidence showed that there was recognition
only of the need for a solution and that “does not render obvious
the achievement that meets that need.”125 Then, to frame its inquiry,
the court focused on “[w]hether the prior art provides the
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
120. Id. at 1373–74. The patents specifically claimed defibrillators capable of performing
multi-mode therapy—therapy that administers different defibrillation in response to different
cardiac events. Id. at 1374.
121. Id. at 1374–75.
122. Id. at 1375. While not the focus of this Article’s discussion, the district court also
found the asserted claims invalid because of a failure to disclose the best mode. Id.
123. Id. at 1378.
124. Id. at 1377.
125. Id.
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suggestion or motivation or teaching to select from prior knowledge
and combine it in a way that would produce the invention at issue is
a question of fact.”126 The Federal Circuit found factual support for
the conclusion of no suggestion or motivation in the testimony of
one of CPI’s experts.127 The court noted that the expert “stress[ed]
that no reference teaches combining” the individual pieces of prior
art “in a single device, or states that it is feasible to do so.”128
This focus on the prior art and suggestion or motivation coming
from the prior art implies that the court was using the same narrow
suggestion test that would later be used in Teleflex. In Cardiac
Pacemaker, the Federal Circuit appears to dismiss the nature of the
problem as being a basis for a suggestion to combine. Then, the
court finds substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of
nonobviousness in the fact that the prior art provided no suggestion.
The court’s opinion appears to reject the full contours of the broad
suggestion test and, like Teleflex, endorse the narrow suggestion test.
2. Appeals from the USPTO
Support for the existence of a narrow suggestion test can also be
found in recent Federal Circuit cases that review appeals from
USPTO decisions. The court’s unpublished opinion in In re Beasley
provides a good example of the narrow suggestion in the USPTO
context.129 In Beasley, the court reviewed the rejection of a patent
application’s claims “directed to the generation of images or
markings on a video display screen using a light pen,” which
included “mapping the display screen into memory on a point-bypoint basis.”130
The examiner found the application invalid because of
obviousness in light of three prior art references.131 One reference
126. Id. at 1378 (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 2002 F.3d 1340, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1377.
128. Id.
129. 117 F. App’x 739, 743–45 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
130. Id. at 740. Beasley’s application was U.S. Patent Application 07/636,839, filed Jan.
2, 1991. Id. The patent’s independent claims specifically required “mapping the display screen
into the memory on a point-by-point basis . . . to provide a one-to-one correspondence”
between the points on the screen and the memory locations. Id.
131. Id. at 740–41. The three references were U.S. Patent No. 3,832,485 (“Pieters”)
combined with either U.S. Patent No. 3,973,245 (“Belser”) or U.S. Patent No. 4,847,604
(“Doyle”). Id.
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disclosed the creation of demarcations on images using a light pen.132
It failed, however, to disclose the point-by-point mapping limitation
claimed by the application at issue.133 The examiner concluded,
however, that one of two other references disclosed “a conventional
bit map memory mapping a display screen into the memory on a
point by point basis.”134 The examiner also concluded that “it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute”
the prior art “bit map memory” for the memory used in the light
pen prior art.135 A person of ordinary skill in the art would be
motivated to make such a change, the examiner concluded, “because
image data stored in the bit map format can be read out rapidly.”136
It was also noted that it was “well known in [the] computer display
art to substitute a bit map memory for a conventional memory such
as the memory used” in the light pen prior art.137 Beasley appealed to
the Board, and the Board maintained the examiner’s obviousness
rejection.138
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no
substantial evidence to support a prima facie case of obviousness.
The court first noted that “the advantages of one type of memory
over another that had been advanced by the examiner and the Board
for the express purpose of showing motivation for the proposed
substitution have been set forth without any supporting citations to
relevant portions of either [the prior art], or any other authority.”139
The court faulted the Board for relying on “the examiner’s and its
own knowledge as skilled artisans.”140 The court also focused on the
lack of “a citation of any relevant, identifiable source of information
justifying” the substitution of the light pen prior art’s memory with
the memory disclosed in the other two pieces of prior art.141
132. Id. (citing the Pieters reference).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 740–41. As the court noted, Belser “concerns a method and apparatus for
‘converting information in coded form into a dot matrix or raster form,’” while Doyle “is
directed to a system that allows a user to point to a feature on an image and cause descriptive
information . . . to appear.” Id. at 741 n.3 (citing the relevant patents).
135. Id. at 741.
136. Id. (quoting the examiner’s office action).
137. Id. at 741 (quoting the examiner’s office action).
138. Id. at 741–42.
139. Id. at 743.
140. Id. at 743–44.
141. Id. at 744.
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The analysis in Beasley appears to be very similar to that of
Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker. The Federal Circuit does not
explicitly reject the notion that a suggestion can come from general
knowledge in the art or the nature of the problem being solved. But,
the court does reject these grounds de facto by appearing to require a
suggestion to be tied in some way to the prior art—again, conflating
the three separate prongs of the suggestion test into one, focused
solely on prior art. Beasley, when viewed with Teleflex and Cardiac
Pacemaker, appears to establish a significant, substantive change in
the law, moving away from the traditional, broad suggestion test to a
narrow test.
B. Federal Circuit Opinions Using the Broad Suggestion Test
After looking at such recent decisions as Teleflex, Cardiac
Pacemaker, and Beasley, it is not hard to see why commentators have
come to the conclusion that the Federal Circuit applies a narrow
suggestion test. However, the full results of my descriptive study
indicate that the court is not always so focused on prior art when
looking for a viable suggestion or motivation. Opinions during the
study’s three-year period allow a suggestion to be based solely on
undocumented grounds coming from either general knowledge of
those skilled in the art or the nature of the problem being solved.142
Full usage of the traditionally recited suggestion test—the broad
suggestion test—can be found in Federal Circuit jurisprudence.
This section discusses some of the cases that establish the broad
suggestion test’s continued existence in detail below. As with the
previous discussion, this section examines appeals both from patent
infringement decisions and final rejections of patent applications by
the USPTO.

142. There are eight cases where the court uses the broad suggestion test. See, e.g., In re
Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Princeton Biochemical, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2005); ISCO Int’l, Inc. v. Conductus, Inc., 123 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In
re Nylen, 97 F. App’x 293 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance, 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2002); N.
Am. Oil Co. v. Star Brite Dist., Inc., 46 F. App’x 629 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As with the narrow
suggestion test cases, only a subset (five) of these cases will be discussed in detail.
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1. Appeals from patent infringement cases
The court’s analysis in Princeton Biochemical, Inc. v. Beckman
Coulter, Inc. provides the first example of the court using the broad
suggestion test.143 Princeton Biochemical sued Beckman Coulter
alleging infringement of Princeton’s patent on a capillary
electrophoresis device.144 The jury found the patent infringed and
valid.145 The district court found the jury’s verdict unsupported by
substantial evidence and, accordingly, granted JMOL that the patent
claims were invalid for reasons of obviousness.146
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant
of JMOL.147 On the issue of obviousness, the court noted that all of
the elements of the claim were disclosed in the prior art, but that this
“does not render a claim obvious.”148 The court looked at the
evidence regarding a suggestion or motivation to combine, but it did
not focus solely on the prior art. Instead, the court agreed with the
district court’s finding of a suggestion to combine in the “knowledge
of those skilled in the art at the time.”149 The court specifically
approved of the testimony from one of Princeton’s expert witnesses,
Dr. Jorgenson. Dr. Jorgenson testified that combining the claimed
elements of coiling and supporting the coils of prior art capillaries
“was within the knowledge of one of skill in the art.”150 Notably, the
court did not require such knowledge be documented in a prior art
reference.
The court also approved of the district court’s finding of a
suggestion in “the nature of the problem.”151 The problem the
invention addressed was the lengthening and securing of the prior
art capillaries.152 Dr. Jorgenson testified that the nature of the

143. 411 F.3d 1332.
144. Id. at 1334. The capillaries referenced are tubes usually made of quartz. Id.
“Electrophoresis is one method available for the investigation of biological materials, and is an
efficient procedure for the separation and detection of proteins and other matter.” Id.
145. Id. at 1333–34.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1334.
148. Id. at 1338.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1338–39.
152. Id.
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problem “called for the [claimed] combination.”153 He stated that a
person with ordinary skill in the art, in order to both lengthen and
secure the capillary, “would know to coil a capillary” and secure it to
a support because “you don’t want a coil floating around without
some kind of support.”154 While the Federal Circuit discussed some
prior art references, the court clearly credited Dr. Jorgenson’s
testimony as supporting, by itself, a finding of suggestion based on
the nature of the problem being solved. Teachings from the prior art
were not required to find such a suggestion.155
Further evidence that the broad suggestion test is still employed
by the Federal Circuit can be found in its opinion in Syntex (U.S.A.)
LLC v. Apotex, Inc.156 In Syntex, the Federal Circuit was reviewing
the results of a bench trial that concluded, in part, that the asserted
patent claims on sterile, preserved eye drops were valid and had been
infringed.157 The court vacated and remanded the finding of validity
because the district court failed to correctly consider evidence
regarding the issue of nonobviousness.158
Of particular relevance to the lower court’s reapplication of the
suggestion test on remand, the Federal Circuit asked the district
court to reconsider the testimony of one of Apotex’s experts.159 The
court noted that the expert presented a “theory of why a person of
skill in the art would have not found it unusual” to modify the prior
art to make the claimed eye drops.160 Apotex’s expert based this
conclusion on “a scientific rationale” and the knowledge of those
skilled in the art.161
The Federal Circuit also uses the broad suggestion test in Ruiz v.
A.B. Chance Co.162 Ruiz filed a declaratory judgment claim that it
had not infringed A.B. Chance Co.’s patents on a screw anchor

153. Id. at 1339.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 407 F.3d 1371, 1379–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
157. Id. at 1373.
158. Id. at 1379–83, 1385.
159. Id. at 1380–82.
160. Id. at 1381.
161. Id. at 1381–82. Apotex’s expert also based this conclusion on teachings from the
references. Id. However, the court specifically noted the independent, non-art bases for the
expert’s conclusion of suggestion. Id.
162. 357 F.3d 1270, 1275–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

1544

COTROPIA.MRO.DOC

1517]

1/20/2007 1:08:43 PM

Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens

system for underpinning foundations.163 As the result of a bench
trial, the district court found that although the patents were
infringed, the claims were invalid as obvious.164
In the case’s second appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court
addressed the district court’s finding of obviousness.165 Specifically,
the court examined the district court’s finding of a motivation to
combine on the nature of the problem of underpinning
foundations.166 The court noted that the “record . . . does not
feature an express written teaching in the art to make [the]
combination” of the two pieces of prior art to render the asserted
claims obvious.167 However, it is not the law “that an express, written
motivation to combine must appear in prior art references before a
finding of obviousness. Stated differently, this court has consistently
stated that a court or examiner may find a motivation to combine
prior art references in the nature of the problem to be solved.”168
The Federal Circuit then approved the district court’s reliance on
evidence that “a person seeking to solve [the] exact same problem”
solved by the claimed invention “would consult the references and
apply their teachings together.”169
The court’s opinion in Ruiz is particularly insightful because it
addresses head on the criticism surrounding the suggestion test. The
court clearly states that a suggestion or motivation may come from
outside the prior art itself.170 And then the court applies this stated
doctrine, basing its affirmance on something other than prior art.171
Ruiz, combined with Princeton Biochemical and Syntex, establishes
that the Federal Circuit, at least in some instances, employs a broad
suggestion test.172

163. Id. at 1273.
164. Id. at 1274.
165. Id. at 1275–77.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1276–77.
168. Id. at 1276 (citing Display Techs., Inc. v. Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 60 F. App’x 787
(Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Haung, 100 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pro-Mold & Tool
Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
169. Ruiz, 357 F.3d at 1277.
170. Id. at 1276.
171. Id. at 1277.
172. Id. at 1276; Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1379–83 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
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2. Appeals from the USPTO
There are also cases involving appeals from the USPTO that
apply a broad suggestion test. For example, the Federal Circuit’s
decision in In re Battiston utilizes the traditional, broad suggestion
test.173 Battiston involved an appeal from a sustained final rejection
finding specific claims directed toward a “splash resistant pan for use
with a commode to aid elderly or infirmed persons who cannot use a
conventional porcelain toilet” invalid.174 The claims at issue required,
in part, a “pan having an upper generally rectangular rim.”175
The examiner rejected the application’s claims based on prior art
cited in the background of the application in combination with the
two other patents.176 Two of the pieces of prior art each disclosed all
of the elements of the application’s claims except the required
“rectangular rim.”177 Another disclosed “a pan comprising an upper
rim and four planar sides.”178 Based on this art, the examiner and
Board found the claims obvious.179
The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of obviousness.180 In
response to Battiston’s argument that the USPTO used hindsight in
rejecting his claims, the Federal Circuit found that substantial
evidence supported the USPTO’s finding of a suggestion to combine
the references.181 The court found such a suggestion for “a
commode configured with a rectangular opening, flow[ing] from the
ordinary knowledge of one skilled in the art.”182
While the opinion is not long on analysis, the court clearly
applies a broad suggestion test. The court explicitly bases its
conclusion of obviousness on an undocumented suggestion—general
knowledge in the art.183 The court fails, however, to articulate the
Board’s specific analysis as to how such knowledge leads to
combining the teachings of a rectangular rim with the other prior
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 285.
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Id. at 284 (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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art. But the court still finds the Board’s analysis and reliance on
knowledge in the art sufficient by itself.184 A specific reference was
not required to support a finding of obviousness.185
The Federal Circuit also applied a broad suggestion test in In re
Nylen.186 In Nylen, the court reviewed the Board’s affirmance of
obviousness rejections of a patent application claiming a device that
applies both a herbicide and a dye to weeds.187 The application’s
claims were found obvious in light of prior art references directed to
herbicide applicators and the combining of dye with agricultural
chemicals.188 The Federal Circuit affirmed this rejection.189 The court
noted that “the references do not themselves indicate that they
should be combined.”190 The court concluded, however, that “the
nature of the problem to be solved . . . would undoubtedly lead a
person of ordinary skill in the art to consult prior art” and make the
claimed device.191 The court’s analysis in Nylen and Battiston
indicates that, as with appeals from patent infringement cases, the
Federal Circuit is using the broad suggestion test, at least in some
instances.
V. RESOLVING THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY—VIEWING THE
SUGGESTION TEST AS A “RULE OF EVIDENCE”
At first blush, some panels of the Federal Circuit employ a
narrow suggestion test while others employ a broad test, creating an
apparent inconsistency in the court’s nonobviousness precedents.
This results in some panels focusing on only prior art as a basis for a
finding of suggestion, while others allow information other than
prior art to establish a suggestion to combine.192 The existence of
such an inconsistency is not surprising because this is not the first
184. Id. at 284.
185. Id. As will be discussed in more detail in Part V, infra, the holding in Battiston
appears to contradict the strict requirement for a citable prior art reference discussed in Beasley.
186. 97 F. App’x 293, 294 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
187. Id. at 293–94. The device helps the user to direct the herbicide to weeds and thus
avoid damaging nearby plants by creating visual confirmation of the area sprayed. Id. at 294.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Compare Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1375–78
(Fed. Cir. 2004), with Princeton Biochemical, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332,
1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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time the Federal Circuit has developed two opposing articulations of
a particular patent law doctrine.193 In fact, such a scenario justifies
the Supreme Court’s taking the Teleflex case in order to, at the very
least, resolve the conflict in Federal Circuit case law and clarify the
contours of the suggestion test.194
However, the focus of the discussion so far has been on
determining the exact contours of the substantive standard
governing the suggestion test and the nonobviousness requirement
in general. That is, what standard or rule governs the legal
determination of nonobviousness? This analysis overlooks the
possibility that the suggestion test is not operating solely on the
substantive law plane. The suggestion test may also perform a
procedural-like function in patent law. More specifically, the Federal
Circuit may be focusing on the type of evidence being presented to
prove a suggestion to combine. This Part investigates whether the
suggestion test contains an evidentiary-like aspect.195
To discern whether an evidentiary-like component to the
suggestion test exists, both the narrow and broad suggestion test
cases are revisited.196 This Part first examines the narrow suggestion

193. A perfect example of this is the claim construction context, where the court was
employing at least two different claim interpretation methodologies. See Christopher A.
Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 83–90 (2005) (detailing the specification methodology and the
heavy presumption methodology). The court has since chosen a single methodology. See
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (adopting the
specification methodology), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
194. Petitioners for certiorari asked for much more, however. See, e.g., Cisco Brief, supra
note 13, at 14–16 (asking the Court to transfer the nonobviousness determination back to the
province of the courts).
195. Taking an evidentiary look at substantive area of intellectual property law is not
novel. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003)
(arguing that some copyright doctrines are formulated to exclude cases whose evidentiary
complexities make them, on balance, socially costly). In fact, Robert Merges has discussed
matters of evidence regarding the Federal Circuit’s case law surrounding secondary factors of
nonobviousness. Merges, supra note 8, at 833–34 (discussing whether the lack of nexus
between a secondary factor and the invention either “undercuts the relevance of the secondary
consideration, and hence its admissibility, or whether it merely detracts from the weight of that
consideration”). Neither of these articles, however, evaluates the evidentiary aspects of the
substantive law under the evidence theory of truth maximization. See infra Part VI (performing
such an evaluation).
196. One can argue that, in order to truly discern the full scope of this evidentiary-like
rule, the underlying district court cases or Board appeals should also be examined to see exactly
what type of evidence was presented. The Federal Circuit could simply be characterizing the
evidence in its opinions to better serve the result it wants to obtain. Unobserved reasoning that
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test cases, focusing on what evidence of undocumented suggestion
the parties presented that the Federal Circuit either ignored or
rejected. This evidence is then compared to the undocumented
suggestion evidence the court accepted in the broad suggestion test
cases. From this comparison, a basic “rule of evidence” emerges.197
the data set being used would simply not pick up could exist, such as a rationale or bias not
expressly set forth in the written opinions examined. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge,
Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 1105, 1128 (2004) (recognizing the possibility of unobserved reasoning in a study
concerning the Federal Circuit’s claim interpretation jurisprudence). In addition, the data set
cannot take into account behavior on the litigants’ part. The types of evidence and
argumentation presented to the court are the product of the litigants. See, e.g., George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2
(1984) (noting that analysis based on appellate cases is incomplete because only a “peculiar
sample of cases” actually are tried and appealed). For example, as previously noted, many of
the suggestion test cases during the three year period studied include only prior art presented
by the litigants as evidence of suggestion. See supra note 105. The opinions thus cannot be
viewed as “independent expressions of methodology or reasoning.” Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra, at 1129.
The Federal Circuit opinions, however, are the best data set from which to discern
an evidentiary rule, if there is one. Certainly these concerns limit the results of this descriptive
inquiry. But the text of the opinions—the observed results—are what critics of the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence are focusing on. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at
12–14; Brief of IP Professors, supra note 13, at 5–9. In addition, due to the nature of the
common law, the opinion text is what establishes the rules and standards governing future
nonobviousness decisions. See Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule Speech Act
Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 498 (2003) (“[I]n the common
law . . . the only texts that judges can reference are the texts of earlier judicial opinions.”).
Those unobserved results stay unobserved. Furthermore, if the Federal Circuit has a particular
view on how the suggestion test should be tailored and wants that view to have some effect on
patent observers, one can validly assume that it would make that view known through its
opinions and its handling of evidence presented in those cases. Finally, the behavior of
litigants, while necessarily affecting the data, may simply reinforce the court’s rule in this area.
Presumably, litigants present evidence and arguments they believe will allow their clients to
prevail. In order to prevail, the evidence and argument must fit within the rules and standards
expressed in the court’s earlier opinions. Thus, litigant behavior can be viewed as a feedback
mechanism that simply further evidences what the courts are doing.
197. The phrase, “rule of evidence,” will be used in this Article as shorthand for the
evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test being discussed. The use of the label “rule of
evidence” is not meant to indicate that rule being discussed is a rule of evidence in the
traditional sense. It is not part of, or born from, the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nor is its
application part of a specific evidentiary proceeding such as a motion in limine or reviewed by
the Federal Circuit for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(c) (noting that
rulings on the admissibility of evidence should be made outside the presence of the jury); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that the standard for review of admission of
scientific evidence is abuse of discretion). The rule, while arguably analogous to Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, is not similar to any established rule of evidence. See infra Part VI.A.3
(noting that the suggestion test’s rule of evidence helps to increase reliability in a way similar to
Rule 702). As will become apparent infra, the rule arguably operates more like a burden of
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The court is not veering from the basic substance of the broad
suggestion. It is simply encountering cases in which none of the
undocumented suggestion evidence is detailed and thorough enough
to be considered in the suggestion test analysis. Testimony or
administrative correspondence is only admissible if it includes
detailed analysis as to how a suggestion arises from the nature of the
problem or general knowledge in the art.198 Once this “rule of
evidence” is initially defined, another pass is made to see if this rule is
refined in any way by the Federal Circuit.
A. Evidence of an Undocumented Suggestion Must Include Detailed
and Thorough Analysis
Teleflex Inc. v. KSR International Co., an apparent narrow
suggestion test case, will act as a starting point in the search for a
“rule of evidence.”199 In Teleflex, the only undocumented evidence
on the issue of suggestion presented by KSR was a declaration from
one of the vice presidents of the accused infringer.200 The declaration
failed to speak to “whether one of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated” to combine the prior art.201 Instead, the
declaration only indicated that the prior art “could have been”
modified to practice the invention.202 The declaration failed to
provide a “specific motivation to combine” to support a finding of
obviousness.203 Without the declaration, the accused infringer could
rely only on the prior art, and, as the court concluded, the prior art
was not directed toward the nature of the problem being solved.204
proof, raising the standard for evidence of undocumented suggestion, rather than a rule of
evidence. The rule does, however, have many evidentiary links as well. And thinking of the rule
in an evidentiary fashion prompts, in some ways, evaluating the rule under evidence theory,
which has benefits in its own right. See infra Part VII.
Thus, “rule of evidence” is simply a label meant to conjure up general notions of
evidence theory and nothing more. Answering whether the rule embodies all aspects of a true
rule of evidence is not necessary for any of the analysis to follow.
198. The administrative correspondence mentioned here is communications to and from
the USPTO during patent prosecution.
199. 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
200. Id. at 289.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. The declaration did speak of a particular motivation, but the identified
motivation would not have combined the prior art in such as way as to practice the invention.
Id.
204. Id. at 288–89.
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A similar situation presented itself in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
St. Jude Medical, Inc.205 The accused infringer presented nothing
more than argument to attempt to prove a suggestion to combine.
As in Teleflex, the accuser relied on the nature of the problem being
solved to establish a suggestion.206 As the court noted, the prior art
established, at best, a recognition of the general problem the
invention addressed.207 No evidence pointed to a “motivation to
create [the patented] cure.”208 The accuser presented no testimony
to support a finding that the nature of the problem being solved
provided a suggestion to combine.209
These two cases were initially characterized as using a suggestion
test substantively different from the broad suggestion test.210 The
narrow suggestion test requires that, regardless of the evidence
presented by the litigants, the court is to accept only prior art to
establish a suggestion to combine. In neither case, however, does the
court explicitly disavow an undocumented basis for finding a
suggestion. In fact, the court in Teleflex specifically recites the broad
suggestion test before beginning its analysis.211
Viewing these cases as making evidentiary-like decisions can
better explain the court’s actions.212 Undocumented avenues to
establishing a suggestion to combine were substantively available to
the litigants—the broad suggestion test was still in play. In these two
cases the litigants merely failed to present anything on suggestion,
other than art, that rose to the requisite level of admissibility. Either
testimony on the issue was not presented, as in Cardiac Pacemaker,
or the testimony did not contain a detailed analysis as to the

205. 381 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
206. Id. at 1377–78.
207. Id. at 1377. There was only a “[r]ecognition of the problem of treating complex
heart arrhythmias.” Id. This established only that there was a need for some type of solution.
Id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 1377–78.
210. See supra Part IV.A.1.
211. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). In fact, to support its recitation of the broad suggestion test,
the court cites Ruiz, which clearly applies the broad suggestion test. Id. (citing Ruiz v. A.B.
Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
212. Again, this may not be an actual rule of evidence, but its impact is similar, and
considering it as an evidentiary creature facilitates the focus on the actual contents of the
suggestion evidence. See supra notes 196–97.
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undocumented suggestion, as in Teleflex. The court had prior art as
the only “admissible” evidence on suggestion to consider.
The existence of an evidentiary-like rule and the specific contours
of the rule become even more apparent when taking a second look at
some of the broad suggestion test cases previously discussed.213
These cases give examples of what types of undocumented
suggestion evidence courts can consider in the suggestion test
analysis.
In Princeton, the court affirmed a district court’s finding of
obviousness that was based on suggestions coming from two
undocumented sources: general knowledge in the art and the nature
of the problem being solved.214 This shows the court’s willingness to
apply the broad suggestion test substantively. Even more interesting,
however, is that the court concentrated on the testimony of a fact
witness, Dr. Jorgenson, in finding an undocumented suggestion.215
In its discussion of a suggestion from “the knowledge of those
skilled in the art at the time of [the] invention,” the court pointed
out that “Dr. Jorgenson supplied detailed analysis of the prior art
and the reasons that one of ordinary skill would possess knowledge
and motivation to combine these simple elements.”216 The court also
focused on the “detailed” testimony of Dr. Jorgenson when
concluding that “the nature of the problem supplies a motivation to
combine th[e] prior art references.”217 Dr. Jorgenson identified what
specific solutions the nature of the problem being solved called for
and indicated how “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time”
would have, accordingly, combined the prior art to make the
patented invention.218 Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony, specifically the
thoroughness of his testimony, allowed the court to base its finding
of obviousness on an undocumented suggestion.219

213. See supra Part IV.B.
214. Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338–40
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
215. Id. at 1337–39.
216. Id. at 1338 (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1339. Dr. Jorgenson “observed that the problem called for coiled electrophoresis tubes, including capillary tubes, secured in place in a variety of ways,” and that it
would have been obvious to “coil a capillary to save space” and to secure the “capillary tube to
a support member.” Id.
219. Id.
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The court engaged in a similar analysis in Syntex when it asked
the district court on remand to consider a suggestion to combine
based on something other than a prior art reference.220 In Syntex, the
court found a fact issue as to whether an anti-inflammatory eye drop
invention was nonobvious, based in part on a suggestion coming
from general knowledge in the art.221 Evidence of an undocumented
suggestion came from testimony of an expert—Dr. Mitra.222 Dr.
Mitra testified to “his theory of why a person of skill in the art would
not have found it unusual” to combine the prior art in such a way as
to practice the invention.223 While relying in part of the teachings of
the prior art, “[Dr. Mitra] also set forth a scientific rationale for”
why one of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have
made the same selections the patentee had made.224 Dr. Mitra also
pointed out that knowledge of certain chemical properties of “the
claimed subject matter would cause a person, ‘as a matter of science’
to ‘go into,’” and thus combine, aspects of the prior art.225
Again, as in Princeton, the court allowed full use of the broad
suggestion test. And, as in Princeton, accompanying the use of the
broad suggestion test was undocumented suggestion evidence in the
form of specific and detailed testimony. The court emphasized the
details of Dr. Mitra’s testimony in Syntex by focusing on the
completeness of his testimony. Significant was not just the fact that
an expert testified to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness or even
that an undocumented suggestion to combine existed. The
testimony in Syntex, and in Princeton, went one step further. It
explained why and how general knowledge in the art or the nature of
the problem being solved provided a suggestion to combine the art
in a specific way in order to render the invention obvious.
The evidence in Princeton and Syntex contains what the evidence
in Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker lacked—detailed and thorough
testimony. When comparing the analysis in these cases, it becomes
apparent that the Federal Circuit is looking for a suggestion to
combine from any of the three categories of the broad suggestion
220. Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
221. See id. at 1378–79.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1381.
224. Id. The court recites Dr. Mitra’s complete reasoning as to why there is a scientific
rationale for a suggestion to combine in a footnote to the opinion. Id. at 1381 n.11.
225. Id. at 1381–82.
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test. Once the reasoning in Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker is
examined more closely, one can see that the court was not
exclusively focused on prior art. The substantive law of suggestion
did not change to limit the inquiry to documented suggestions.226
Instead, the court is exercising an evidentiary-like aspect of the
suggestion test by examining the contents of the undocumented
suggestion evidence. Substantively, a suggestion to combine can be
proven by undocumented means. However, an additional
requirement for undocumented suggestions is at work. The court is
looking for the detail and specificity it found in Princeton and Syntex
to allow such evidence to be considered.
The same evidentiary requirement found in the patent
infringement cases is more directly articulated in the USPTO cases.
For example, the court’s analysis in Beasley specifically talks of the
evidentiary requirements of establishing a suggestion through
undocumented avenues.227 The court rejected the USPTO’s
conclusion that those with skill in the art would have known the
advantages of conventional computer memory over bit map memory,
and thus would have readily substituted one for the other.228 This
conclusion was rejected because the suggestion “appear[ed]
unaccompanied by any indication of its origins.”229 “Neither the
Board nor the examiner ha[d] identified in the record any source of
information—either from the references cited or otherwise” to
support this fact.230
In other words, the court in Beasley looked for the same detailed
analysis it found in Princeton and Syntex. Simple conclusory
statements by patent examiners or the Board, both of whom are
required to have technical expertise,231 were not enough. Any
evidence of an undocumented suggestion must consist of more than
a mere conclusion. For such information to be considered—to be
admissible—it must demonstrate a requisite level of rigor and detail.

226. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
227. In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 743–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
228. Id. at 743.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 745 (Dyk, J., dissenting); see also In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“The patent examiner and the Board are deemed to have experience in the field of
the invention.”).
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The decision in Beasley can be viewed as an evidentiary decision.
The USPTO provided statements relevant to a finding of an
undocumented suggestion. The problem is that the statements the
USPTO relied on did not rise to the level of admissibility. While this
has the de facto impact of limiting the grounds for suggestion to the
prior art itself, this is a secondary effect of the “rule of evidence,” not
a change in substantive law. The broad suggestion test still applies,
but, as in Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker, no “admissible” evidence
is presented to support an undocumented suggestion.
Admittedly, the origins of this discussion in Beasley are grounded
in administrative law. The court in Beasley cites its earlier decision in
In re Lee for the proposition that the USPTO must ground its
decisions in “objective evidence of record.”232 In Lee, the court came
to this conclusion because the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
institutes a “reasoned decisionmaking” scheme, and in order to
ensure a “sound decision” has been reached, the administrative
agency must “articulate[] the reasons for that decision.”233 Thus, to
ensure proper review of the USPTO’s decision of obviousness, the
USPTO “must not only assure that the requisite findings are made,
based on evidence of record, but must also explain the reasoning by
which the findings are deemed to support the agency’s
conclusion.”234
However, the rule of law established in Lee and used in Beasley is
still procedural in nature, not substantive. Thus, the reasoning in Lee
is already much closer to evoking evidence law—another procedural
area of law—than substantive law. In addition, the need for effective
judicial review of an agency’s actions entails, at least in part, a
determination of whether the agency’s decision is supported by
evidence that reaches a specific level—substantial evidence.235 Finally,
the Lee decision clearly sets forth evidentiary standards. Any factual
determination by the USPTO must be “based on objective evidence
of record.”236 Common knowledge and common sense are not

232. Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 745 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Lee, 277 F.3d at 1343).
233. Lee, 277 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)).
234. Id. at 1344.
235. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2005) (setting forth the standards of review). The APA
specifically requires an agency’s factual findings be supported by substantial evidence. Id. §
706(2)(E).
236. Lee, 277 F.3d at 1343.
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substitutes for such evidence.237 These statements are directed at the
types of evidence an agency can rely on and, thus, establish an
evidentiary-like standard. The discussion in Beasley, while grounded
in administrative law, further supports a finding that the suggestion
test is behaving in an evidentiary-like manner.
B. Amount of Detail Required Is Related to the Technological
Complexity of the Invention
The evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test just discussed—
that evidence of an undocumented suggestion must be based on
testimony including detailed analysis—explains most of the apparent
inconsistency between the broad and narrow suggestion test cases.
This rule, however, does not explain the results in all of the cases.
There are still a few cases discussed in Part III of this Article—Ruiz,
Battiston, and Nylen—wherein the court finds an undocumented
suggestion even though the existence of detailed testimony analyzing
this suggestion is lacking. In such situations, under the rule of
evidence just articulated, a suggestion test cannot be established. No
admissible evidence under the suggestion test is presented, and
therefore, no evidence can substantiate a factual finding of a
suggestion to combine. In other words, a similar situation as in
Teleflex, Cardiac Pacemaker, and Beasley is presented. But such a
result is not reached by the Federal Circuit—the court still allows a
suggestion to be found on undocumented grounds.
The one characteristic all of these cases have in common is that
the patented technology is fairly simplistic. For example, in Ruiz, the
patent at issue claimed a screw anchor system for underpinning a
building’s foundation. The invention was comprised of a screw
anchor and a connecting metal bracket.238 A prior art reference
disclosed the claimed screw anchor component while another piece
of art disclosed the claimed metal bracket.239 The suggestion
question centered on combining these two pieces of prior art
together to make the patent invention. The accused infringer

237. Id. at 1345 (distinguishing earlier CCPA precedent set forth in In re Bozek, 416
F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
238. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1272–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
239. Id. at 1273–74.
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presented testimony that “the need for a connecting element” for a
screw anchor “was widely known.”240
Notably, the Ruiz court did not focus on whether this testimony
was detailed or analyze how general knowledge in the art or the
nature of the problem would provide a suggestion. Thus, under the
evidentiary rule discerned from cases such as Princeton and Syntex,
this conclusory testimony should not be able to establish a
suggestion to combine. But, the court concluded that “a motivation
to combine prior art references” can be found “in the nature of the
problem to be solved.”241
More importantly, the court noted that “[t]his form of
motivation to combine evidence is particularly relevant with simpler
mechanical technologies.”242 In Ruiz, such a simpler mechanical
technology is present—an anchor screw and metal bracket used to
secure foundations. In addition, the suggestion question presents an
even easier technological question—would a person of ordinary skill
look to using metal brackets to physically secure anchor screws
already known in the art? With an easier technology to comprehend,
the evidentiary standard governing undocumented suggestions is
lowered.
Such an analysis also explains the court’s conclusion in Battiston
and Nylen. Both of these cases involve fairly straightforward, easily
understood technologies. In Battiston, the technology at issue was a
splash resistant pan for use with a commode.243 Two pieces of prior
art taught all of the elements of the claimed splash resistant pan
except the required rectangular opening. Instead, they disclosed an
elongated opening.244 Another reference disclosed the claimed
generally rectangular shape of the pan opening.245 The court affirmed
the USPTO’s finding of obviousness, specifically finding substantial
evidence to support the USPTO’s conclusion that a suggestion to
combine “flow[ed] from the ordinary knowledge of one skilled in
the art.”246

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.
In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281, 282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 283 (describing the contents of the Rose and APA references).
Id. (describing the Haskins reference as having an upper rim and four planar sides).
Id. at 283–84 (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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The court did not rely on any specific testimony or detailed
explanation by the examiner or the Board to support the
undocumented suggestion. However, the Federal Circuit still found
evidence to support a suggestion coming solely from the general
knowledge of the art. This appears to fly in the face of the reasoning
set forth in Beasley and Lee. In those cases, the court specifically
required evidence of a suggestion to combine to reach a minimum
threshold.247 The USPTO needed to present “more than conclusory
statements of generalized advantages and convenient assumptions
about skilled artisans”; it needed to “point to some concrete
evidence in the record in support” of a suggestion to combine.248
Here, no such requirement is discussed or used.249
A similar situation is presented in Nylen.250 Nylen involved the
application for a patent covering an applicator bottle that combines a
herbicide with a dye.251 This combination is used to help a user both
direct the application of the herbicide and provide visual
confirmation of the weeds treatment.252 The claimed herbicide was
well known in the prior art, as was the combination of dyes with
other agricultural chemicals.253 As the court noted, none of the prior
art itself “indicat[ed] that they should be combined.”254 No other
concrete evidence of a suggestion is identified in the opinion.
However, the court still affirmed the USPTO’s finding of a
suggestion based on the nature of the problem being solved. Again,

247. See In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
248. Id. (quoting In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
249. There is a possibility that the Board and examiner provided such detail and the
Federal Circuit simply decided not to discuss it in the opinion. Such a situation is even more
likely considering Battiston is an unpublished decision.
But the focus on the need for such evidence in another unpublished decision,
Beasley, suggests otherwise. In Beasley, the court went to great lengths to explain both the basis
for the USPTO’s finding of suggestion and how the basis lacked any evidence meeting the
standards set forth in Lee. See Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 744. If such analysis encapsulated the
full evidentiary requirement of the suggestion test, the court in Battiston would have either
noted the existence of such detailed undocumented suggestion evidence or found no support
for an undocumented suggestion.
250. In re Nylen, 97 F. App’x 293, 294 (Fed. Cir 2004).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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as in Battiston, the court appears to ignore the rule of evidence
utilized in Lee and Beasley.255
The lack of a heightened evidentiary requirement in both
Battiston and Nylen is explained with the same reasoning used to
explain the court’s analysis in Ruiz. The technological questions at
issue are so simplistic that a rigorous evidentiary-like standard is not
needed. In these cases, the court has modified the rule of evidence
aspect of the suggestion test. As the complexity of the technology at
issue decreases, so does the required detail of any evidence of an
undocumented suggestion.
The court in Beasley even mentions technological complexity
when it applies the requirement that undocumented suggestion
evidence include detailed analysis.256 The court needed to determine
whether those skilled in the art appreciated the speed advantage of
conventional computer memory over bit map memories and “the
feasibility of substituting one for the other.”257 Such a factual inquiry
stands in sharp contrast to the geometric shape of the splash pan
design at issue in Battiston or the combination of dye and herbicide,
instead of another agricultural chemical, in Nylen. The suggestion
test’s rule of evidence required more detail in Beasley than in
Battiston or Nylen because the technology in Beasley was much more
sophisticated.
This modification to the rule of evidence part of the suggestion
test is further substantiated by the other suggestion test cases
previously discussed.258 Princeton involved a patent on a capillary
electrophoresis device, and Syntex considered a patent for anti-

255. A critique similar to that discussed supra note 250 can be lodged against the court’s
analysis in Nylen.
256. In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
257. Id. (discussing how such information can “hardly be described as a fact that is of
‘instant and unquestionable demonstration’ for the purpose of taking official notice
unsupported by any citation” (quoting In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A. 1970))).
258. This adjustment to the “rule of evidence” aspect of the suggestion test being
discussed also falls in line with the requirements governing an examiner’s usage of common
knowledge to establish a prima face case of obviousness. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2144.03 (8th ed., rev. 2, 2004). Some have argued that liberal use of this
“official notice” provision improperly shifts the burden of proving nonobviousness to the
patent applicant. See Dawn-Marie Bey, Shifting the Burden of Proving Patentability Vel Non in
View of Dickinson v. Zurko, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18–28 (2004).
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inflammatory eye drops.259 In both cases, the court considered an
undocumented suggestion to combine, and the evidence of the
undocumented suggestion presented met the heightened
evidentiary-like test. Such evidence was required because the
technologies at issue were fairly sophisticated. The same is true when
looking at the facts of Cardiac Pacemaker, where the technology at
issue was the design of a specific implantable cardiac defibrillator.260
Such technology is complex, and thus, fairly detailed testimony was
required to establish an undocumented motivation to combine.
Detailed testimony was not presented, and, as a result, an
undocumented suggestion could not be established.261
The evidentiary aspect of the suggestion test, therefore, can be
further refined. Detailed testimony is required to establish a
suggestion to combine based on general knowledge in the art or
nature of the problem. However, the level of detail required is
related to the complexity of the technology at issue. As the
technology becomes very complex, such as in Princeton or Cardiac
Pacemaker, the court requires the testimony regarding an
undocumented suggestion to match that complexity. If the
technology is simple, such as in Ruiz and Battiston, admissible
testimony on an undocumented suggestion can be simple as well.
This reformulation of the suggestion test’s “rule of evidence” can be
expressed graphically, as shown in Figure 1 below.

259. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Bekman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
260. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1373–74 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
261. Id. at 1376.
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"Rule of Evidence"

"Admissible"
Detail and
Analysis of
Testimony

Not
"Admissible"

Complexity of Technology

FIGURE 1

In Figure 1, the “rule of evidence” is represented as a function—
the dotted line in the center of the graph.262 If the level of detail and
analysis in a particular testimony for a given technology meets or
exceeds the value on this line, the evidence is “admissible” and can
be considered. If the detail and analysis for a given technology falls
below this line, the evidence is not “admissible.”263 Cases such as

262. Whether the relationship is a direct proportion, as depicted, or an asymptote that
approaches infinity as the technology gets incredibly complex is not discernible from the cases
discussed. The only aspect known for sure is that as the level of complexity increases, so does
the required analysis for the evidence to be considered. There would be reason to believe that
as the complexity gets greater, the demand for detail and analysis may increase at a faster rate—
creating an asymptotic relationship. Thus, the linear relationship shown is merely
demonstrative and not a perfect representation of the aspect of the suggestion test being
discussed.
263. This type of relationship is very similar to the one established by Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. Rule 403 denies the admission of evidence where its probative value is
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Thus, as the
evidence becomes more probative, the system’s tolerance for prejudicial effect increases. See
ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 128–29 (2d ed. 2004). If the evidence has little
probative value, the concern of any prejudice may keep the evidence out. Id. The probative
versus prejudicial balancing required has the same direct relationship as the rule of evidence
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Princeton and Syntex, involving fairly complex technologies, had very
detailed testimony to support their claim of an undocumented
suggestion. The testimony in these cases fell above the evidentiarylike function shown in Figure 1 and was therefore available for
consideration. This situation is comparable to that in Beasley where
the technology was complex and little detail or analysis was
presented by the USPTO. Evidence such as this falls below the
function in Figure 1 and cannot establish a suggestion.
The validity of this further refinement of the rule depicted in
Figure 1 can be tested against the facts presented and ultimate
decision in Teleflex. The patent in Teleflex described an adjustable
pedal assembly for automobiles wherein the electronic throttle
control is mounted to the support bracket as opposed to the pedal.264
“This configuration avoids movement of the electronic control
during adjustment of the pedal’s position on the assembly.”265 The
complexity of the technology at issue does not rise to the level of the
capillary electrophoresis device at issue in Princeton or the cardiac
defibrillator at issue in Cardiac Pacemaker. However, an adjustable
automobile pedal with electronic controls is not as simple as the
splash pan at issue in Battiston. The technology sits slightly above the
technology at issue in Ruiz. The pedal has electronic components so
it is not solely a “simple[] mechanical technology.”266 But the
electronic components play a minimal role and, thus, the invention’s
sophistication is only slightly higher than the foundation anchors in
Ruiz.
Therefore, in order to establish an undocumented suggestion,
the alleged infringer in Teleflex needed to provide testimony that had
slightly more detail than that presented in Ruiz. In Ruiz, the court
notes only that testimony on the issue was presented.267 No concern
for its detail is discussed. Therefore, in Teleflex, something slightly
more than a minimal amount of detail was needed. The litigants
failed to provide any detail. Other than the prior art presented, the
only testimony on suggestion indicated that the prior art “could have
being discussed. As the level of detail and analysis of the testimony increases, the testimony
becomes admissible for greater and greater complexities of technology.
264. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
265. Id. at 284.
266. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance, Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
267. Id.
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been” combined to make the invention and addressed a combination
that was not the claimed invention.268 Any detail on the issue of
suggestion was non-existent. Accordingly, because of the evidentiary
aspect of the suggestion test, this testimony was not considered, and
the grounds for proving a suggestion were limited to the prior art.269
The testimony fell below the evidentiary-like function depicted in
Figure 1 and was therefore not considered.
VI. NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF THE SUGGESTION TEST’S “RULE
OF EVIDENCE”
The descriptive study performed above provides an
understanding of exactly how the Federal Circuit is using the
suggestion test. The test has not been limited to documented
suggestions. Undocumented suggestions can still be used to prove a
patented invention obvious. Things are not as prior-art-focused as
recent critics would have one believe.
However, the analysis cannot end with describing exactly how
the court uses the suggestion test. An argument can still be made
that the suggestion test’s rule of evidence produces harms similar to
those produced by the narrow suggestion test. The rule necessarily
limits the breadth of evidence that can prove an undocumented
suggestion. With a smaller evidentiary basis to establish a suggestion
to combine—thereby establishing obviousness—the result of the
evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test may be a lowering of
the nonobviousness requirement. Thus, while the suggestion test has
not narrowed, as most critics believe, the test may still be hampering
the proper operation of the nonobviousness requirement.
This Part explores the impact the suggestion test’s rule of
evidence has on the nonobviousness requirement. It begins with
looking at the rule under evidence theory. Specifically, the
suggestion test’s rule of evidence is examined to see if it helps
maximize the likelihood that a correct determination of suggestion,
and thus obviousness or nonobviousness is made by courts and the
USPTO. While the rule is not a traditional rule of evidence,270
looking at it under evidence theory helps to further tease out and
268. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 289 (detailing the declaration offered by the accused
infringer, KSR).
269. Id. at 287–90.
270. See supra note 197.
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test its evidentiary-like qualities. Second, the rule’s effect on the
nonobviousness doctrine is discussed. This whole normative analysis
revolves around whether the rule helps prevent both erroneous
determinations of obviousness (Type I error) and nonobviousness
(Type II error).271 From this analysis, the propriety of the rule of
evidence is discerned.
A. Rule Reduces Overvaluation of Suggestion Evidence
One of the main purposes of evidence law is to ensure that “the
truth may be ascertained” in a given judicial proceeding.272 The
“overarching function of evidence law is to maximize the . . .
probability that factfinders in our adjudicatory system will accurately
determine objective historical truth.”273 Thus, evidence law is meant
to maximize truth by “increas[ing] the frequency with which truth is
ascertained.”274 Staying true to this part of evidence theory, the
suggestion test’s rule of evidence is analyzed to see if it prevents
overvaluation of suggestion evidence.

271. A “Type I error” is a false-positive, which in this context is a false finding of
obviousness, while a “Type II error” is a false-negative, which in this context is a false finding
of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Katherine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 639–40 (2005) (discussing Type I and Type II errors in the context
of criminal law); Alex Stein, Essay, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the
Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199, 1207 (2001)
(discussing Type I and Type II errors in the context of evidence law).
272. FED. R. EVID. 102.
273. Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 995, 996 (1994). Seigel uses the term “optimistic rationalism” to identify this “nearuniversal[ly] accept[ed]” purpose of evidence law. See id. He critiques this optimistic
rationalism, considering it too static and failing to consider any “postmodern jurisprudential
perspectives.” Id.
For the purposes of this Article, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence will be
evaluated under the traditional, truth maximization norm of evidence law. Evaluations under
different evidence theories are left for another day and perhaps another author.
274. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence,
87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501 (2001) (“[A] majority of the rules of evidence have as their
primary rationale their (alleged) truth-conducive virtues.”).
Evidence law has other justifications, such as “reducing accidents and avoiding
litigation.” Id. at 1498–99 (citing FED. R. EVID. 407–411). In fact, most of the Federal Rules
of Evidence can be evaluated under a law and economics approach. See, e.g., Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477 (1999). This
Article will focus on evaluating the rule of evidence aspect of the suggestion test under the
primary rationale Allen and Leiter identify.
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1. Dangers of overvaluation
Overvaluation occurs when a trier of fact concludes that a piece
of information places him or her closer to the truth than, in reality,
the evidence actually does.275 That is, jurors, or a judge, assign more
value to the evidence than it really provides. For example,
overvaluation occurs if jurors assign a piece of evidence a value of
five, when its correct value is three.276 For there to be a real threat of
overvaluation, “it must be the case that what most people believe to
be true”—that the evidence is valued at five in the given example—
“is in reality false.”277
Overvaluation can reduce the accuracy of a factfinder’s
conclusions.278 By concluding that a piece of evidence gets him or
her closer to a particular truth than it does in actuality, the factfinder
may ultimately be led astray. When the factfinder assumes a false
notion, he may draw inferences that lead to more false beliefs. Thus,
areas of evidence law attempt to minimize overvaluation by heavily
monitoring the admission of types of evidence prone to
overvaluation.
The rules governing character evidence illustrate such an area of
evidence law. Character evidence can have some probative value as to
the correct result of a factual question.279 Character traits have some
influence on behavior and, as a result, have some predictive value as
to whether an individual did or did not act in line with her past

275. See Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1547, 1598–1601 (discussing overvaluation in the setting of character evidence); see also
Richard D. Friedman, “E” Is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV.
2029, 2030 (2001). Notably, Friedman believes that this justification for evidence law has
been overvalued itself. Id. (“[Overvaluation] has been given far too much credence in
evidentiary discourse.”). “Exclusion is not justified on the basis of overvaluation unless the jury
so massively overvalues the evidence that considering the evidence leads it further away from,
rather than closer to, the truth.” Id.
276. See Melilli, supra note 275, at 1598 (setting forth an example to explain
overvaluation of character evidence).
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 1597–99; see also David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence
Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1181–84
(1998). Notably, Melilli and others conclude that overvaluation is not as significant a problem
for character evidence as others may think. See Melilli, supra note 275, at 1599.
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actions.280 However, a trier of fact may have the propensity to ignore
the real possibility that someone acted out of character. In such an
instance, character evidence is overvalued. The factfinder may weigh
the character evidence so heavily as to ignore other objective
evidence to the contrary.281 In order to avoid this overvaluation,
evidence law limits the admissibility of character evidence.282
Scientific evidence may also be overvalued. Evidence on issues of
science, particularly expert evidence, usually “presents information or
a perspective that is unfamiliar to most jurors and judges.”283 Because
of this lack of familiarity, such evidence is extremely important to the
factfinder and also has the “power to persuade.”284 A factfinder is
likely to give scientific evidence the full value for which it is offered
because he or she is uncomfortable discounting it.285 Thus, scientific
evidence that has little absolute value has the propensity to be
overvalued by the factfinder, leading to unfair results.286
Overvaluation occurs not because the factfinder increases the
evidence’s value, as with character evidence, but because the
factfinder is unlikely to properly decrease the evidence’s value. In an
attempt to prevent overvaluation, evidence law asks the court to act
as the gatekeeper for this type of evidence.287 Courts are asked to
ensure that only reliable expert evidence is admitted. Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony be “based upon
sufficient facts or data” and that it be “the product of reliable
principles and methods.”288 This focus on reliability attempts to
ensure that the conclusions offered by the expert are more likely to
280. See Leonard, supra note 279, at 1182 (“[I]t has long been believed that evidence of
character satisfies the lenient test of logical relevance when offered as proof of conduct.”).
Leonard notes that this conclusion has been challenged. Id. at 1182 n.89.
281. See id. at 1184. This overvaluing is the product of “inferential error prejudice.” Id.
There is empirical work that suggests the opposite, that factfinders do not tend to overvalue.
See Melilli, supra note 275, at 1599.
282. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (limiting, generally, the admission of character evidence
to prove conduct).
283. Friedman, supra note 275, at 2048.
284. Id.
285. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in
Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1939 (2001) (“Courts fear that
[scientific evidence] comes cloaked in an aura of infallibility and that this leads jurors to give it
more credence than it deserves.”).
286. Friedman, supra note 275, at 2048.
287. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
288. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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be true than not.289 Thus, the rule of evidence helps to ensure that
when the factfinder accepts the expert’s conclusions, what he or she
is accepting is more likely to be the full truth on a given issue.
2. Rule mitigates the hindsight bias
Evidence of a suggestion presents similar problems of
overvaluation in the form of hindsight bias. As already explained, the
mere existence of the invention makes it easier for the factfinder to
conceptualize the invention’s creation and thus introduces hindsight
bias into the nonobviousness inquiry.290 This bias prompts
overvaluation of certain evidence by the factfinder. The factfinder
may assign more value to facts such as the current existence of the
patentee’s invention and the existence of the elements of the
invention in different pieces of prior art than this evidence necessarily
provides.291 This hindsight bias, by prompting this overvaluation,
brings the factfinder closer to a finding of obviousness than the
evidence truly establishes.
The substantive part of the suggestion test is meant to de-bias
the factfinder.292 By requiring the factfinder to conclude that there
was a suggestion to combine, the factfinder is required to
substantiate his or her hindsight bias in evidence. A reason to
combine the prior art must come from a specific informational
source in existence at the time of the invention: the prior art, general
knowledge in the art, or the nature of the problem.293 The present
existence of the invention or elements of the invention in the past is
not enough to warrant a finding of obviousness.294 Another fact must

289. Friedman, supra note 275, at 2049.
290. See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he very ease with
which the invention can be understood may prompt one ‘to fall victim to the insidious effect of
a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the invention taught is used against its
teacher.’” (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed.
Cir. 1983))); Mandel, supra note 62, at 6–7; supra Part II.B.
291. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir.
2000). The mere fact that each element of the patented invention can be found in the prior art
does not render the claims obvious. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Bekman Coulter, Inc.,
411 F.3d 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
292. See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 357 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
293. See supra Part II.B.
294. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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be proven: a suggestion or motivation to combine the prior art that
existed at the time of the invention’s creation.295 The bias alone
cannot result in a finding of obviousness.
Overvaluation through hindsight bias is similar to the
overvaluation associated with character evidence. Character evidence
can be seen as creating a “forward bias.” Character evidence provides
a factfinder information regarding how that individual has acted in
the past. Factfinders are likely to overvalue this evidence from the
past because there is a tendency to believe that the past is a perfect
indicator of future action.296 Evidence of what has occurred ex ante
overinfluences a factfinder’s evaluation of a specific, ex post, action.
Character evidence, therefore, creates a forward-looking bias.
Hindsight bias creates overvaluation in a similar way, only it works in
the opposite direction. The invention’s existence causes a decisionmaker to believe what is presently true is a perfect indicator for what
would have happened in the past.
Of specific importance for the suggestion test’s rule of evidence
is the fact that hindsight bias also affects the factfinder’s valuation of
the suggestion evidence itself. The hindsight bias lens is not
magically removed when the factfinder is evaluating evidence of a
suggestion to combine.297 The continued existence of hindsight bias
causes the factfinder to have a predilection toward seeing a
suggestion in places where it does not exist or where support for its
existence is extremely weak. Hindsight bias can lead to the
overvaluation of the very tool meant to mitigate the bias. Thus,
another legal tool is needed to insulate the suggestion test from
being infected with bias as well.
The evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test adds the
needed extra layer of protection against hindsight bias and, thus,
overvaluation. The suggestion test’s rule of evidence requires either
that evidence of suggestion be grounded in the prior art or that
testimony given regarding an undocumented suggestion is of a
requisite level of detail and analysis.298 This requisite level is defined
by the level of complexity of the technology at issue.299 By
295. See Nat’l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1337.
296. See Leonard, supra note 279, at 1181–83.
297. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 62, at 16–17 (performing a study that concluded that
even instructions directed at de-biasing a decision-maker have little effect).
298. See supra Part V.A.
299. See supra Part V.B.
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introducing additional requirements for the admissibility of
undocumented suggestion evidence, the rule helps mitigate the
effects of hindsight bias on the main substantive suggestion inquiry.
The rule prevents hindsight bias because it is formulated to
admit suggestion evidence whose traits make it less susceptible to
being overvalued. First, the rule allows all prior art to be considered
as possibly establishing a suggestion.300 Prior art is documentary
evidence that was available to one skilled in the art at the time of the
invention.301 This information, by definition, is formulated and fixed
ex ante.302 It therefore cannot be influenced by the patented
invention’s existence. The drafter of the art did not know of the
patented invention and could not be affected by the hindsight bias.
In addition, the information contained therein was not created in
response to the particular litigation or proceeding at issue. Prior art is
not written with knowledge of the nonobviousness analysis taking
place. This makes the information contained within the prior art a
further step removed from any possible effects of hindsight bias.
Finally, the possible suggestion in the prior art speaks for itself. Prior
art is not inherently accompanied by a narration of a fact witness or
expert.303 Instead, the words or drawings in the reference are relied
upon by themselves to establish a suggestion to combine the prior
art references. This further insulates the art’s teachings from the
hindsight bias.
Adding to this potential for overvaluation is the fact that the
undocumented suggestions are perfect homes for a decision-maker’s
hindsight bias. The prior art says what it says. Hindsight bias can
color one’s view of the meaning of a specific text or diagram
contained within the prior art. But the bias has a limited amount of

300. See, e.g., Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(evaluating the prior art to see if it established a suggestion), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965
(2006).
301. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (detailing what qualifies as prior art in patent law).
302. See id.
303. Testimony can accompany the prior art. This testimony would be influenced by
hindsight bias and would not be directly addressed by the rule of evidence articulated. See
supra Part V.A (indicating that the suggestion test’s rule of evidence is focused solely on
undocumented suggestion evidence). However, information in the prior art is not affected by
hindsight and can check the testimony. The prior art limits the amount of overvaluation that
can occur.
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information with which to play.304 Such natural limitations are not
present when it comes to undocumented general knowledge in the
art or the nature of the problem being solved. How this general
knowledge and the problem the invention addresses would have
affected a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention is much more amorphous. This lack of tangibleness gives
much more wiggle room to the factfinder. These factors make an
undocumented basis for suggestion the path of least resistance to
ground the hindsight bias in evidence of suggestion.
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence minimizes the hindsight
bias effects on undocumented evidence by requiring such evidence
include a requisite level of detail and analysis. Requiring such
testimony to be thorough and complete mitigates overvaluation by
both the testifier and the factfinder. First, a requirement of rigor
forces the testifier to articulate why she concludes general knowledge
or the nature of the problem provides a suggestion to combine.305
Conclusory statements or mere argumentation are not enough.306
The rule forces the testimony to go further, beyond statements that
could be supported by bias alone, and provide detailed reasoning as
to the foundation for and conclusion of suggestion.307 Thus, the
USPTO’s mere conclusion in Beasley that one of ordinary skill would
have known the advantages of conventional memory over bit map
memory, and thus substituted one for the other, could easily be
prompted by hindsight bias alone.308 Bias does not, however, create
reasoning and analysis for this conclusion. For example, the detail
and analysis in Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony in Princeton explaining
exactly how one of ordinary skill would possess knowledge to coil
and secure a capillary tube is more likely the product of Dr.
304. The universe of prior art is expressly limited by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Section
102 establishes a set of detailed rules defining what can, and cannot, be considered prior art.
See id.
305. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 742–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring the
USPTO to specifically articulate how knowledge in the art creates a suggestion to combine);
see also supra Part V.B.
306. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding the
Administrative Procedure Act requires more than conclusory statements or common sense
findings).
307. Hindsight can influence this reasoning; but, presumably, the more detail that is
required, the less likely mere bias can support the creation of particular details and analysis. In a
sense, by requiring detail and analysis, the testifier must confront her own bias and either
ground it in detailed analysis or have her testimony ignored.
308. Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 741–44.
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Jorgenson’s grounded, rational belief in the suggestion than it is of
bias.309 Requiring thorough analysis de-biases testimony on
suggestion.
Overvaluation by the factfinder is also mitigated. Undocumented
grounds of suggestion lend themselves to hindsight bias. The
conclusion that an invention was easy to create is simpler to realize
through the vehicles of general knowledge in the art or the nature of
the problem being solved as opposed to the prior art itself.310 And
when such undocumented suggestions can be established through
conclusory testimony or even argumentation, it becomes even easier
for a factfinder to find support for their hindsight bias. Simple
statements such as “anyone knowledgeable of the prior art would
have known how to create the invention” are easy to accept when
one is already preconditioned to the ultimate conclusion. But as the
testimony becomes more complex, the factfinder is faced with actual
detail and analysis that must be evaluated. The testimony presents
more than the conclusion the hindsight bias favors. This increase in
complexity forces the factfinder, as it does the testifier, to truly
consider the question of suggestion instead of simply relying on
hindsight bias. In turn, the testimony the rule of evidence admits is
testimony that a factfinder is less likely to overvalue.
The rule of evidence does allow the required detail of the
evidence to decrease as the level of complexity of the patent
technology decreases.311 Accordingly, the protection against
hindsight bias and overvaluation decreases as the technology at issue
becomes simpler. It might seem intuitive that such a decrease would
be detrimental because the effects of hindsight bias are greater in
simple technology cases.312 Because the technology is so simple, it
becomes even easier for the factfinder to conceptualize the
invention’s creation.313 However, while there is some logic behind
309. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338–
39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
310. It is easier to conclude that something is obvious because those in the field would
have generally known how to create such an invention or that the problem itself prompted the
invention. These undocumented suggestion categories are unstructured by design, and the lack
of firm boundaries lends them to easy use in rhetorical statements and conclusions of an
invention’s obviousness.
311. See supra Part V.B.
312. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(finding simple art creates the temptation of hindsight bias).
313. See id.
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this line of thinking, the opposite is actually true: “[H]indsight bias
tends to be stronger where an outcome is unexpected.”314 In
addition, the effects of bias generally increase the more unfamiliar
the decision-maker is with the subject matter at issue. So, the more
sophisticated the technological advance, the higher likelihood
evaluation of this advance will be influenced by hindsight bias.315 As
technological complexity increases, the decision-maker is coming
upon increasingly unfamiliar territory and, as a result, is less likely to
try to reason out a specific answer. Accordingly, the decision-maker
is more likely to cave in to the influence of hindsight bias.316 The rule
of evidence aspect of the suggestion test is thus tailored to increase
its defense against hindsight bias and overvaluation by requiring
more rigor in admissible testimony.317
3. Rule increases reliability
The rule of evidence part of the suggestion test also increases the
reliability of the evidence admitted. Some of the analysis contrasting
documented versus undocumented suggestion evidence with regards
to hindsight bias applies equally to issues of reliability. Prior art
evidence of a suggestion to combine is inherently reliable because of
its defining characteristics. As previously mentioned, prior art is
drafted well before the proceedings in which it is used.318 It is most
likely created by one of skill in the art and its intended audience is
others in the same technological area, not a judge or jury.319
Therefore, suggestions from prior art are reliable because the
information provided is independent and insulated from the

314. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 10–11 (citing David A. Schkade & Lynda M.
Kilbourne, Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 106–07 (1991)).
315. See id. at 11.
316. See id.
317. See supra Part V.B., Figure 1.
318. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (requiring prior art to be in existence before the date
of invention). But see id. § 102(b) (identifying a class of prior art that can exist after the initial
invention if the art also existed more than one year prior to the filing date of a patent on that
invention).
319. Prior art can be created by those of a higher or lower skill than the ordinary skill in
the art. In addition, the art may be intended for a different audience. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that a patentee may act as
her own lexicographer and give a term a different definition than its ordinary meaning).
However, these types of variations are unlikely.
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motivations of the judicial environment.320 In addition, the extent of
information prior art can provide is limited to the text and diagrams
contained within the prior art. This documentation is selfauthenticating. Just as the concreteness of prior art helps to reduce
the hindsight bias, it also increases the reliability of any suggestion
contained therein. Similar built-in reliability measures are not present
in testimony speaking to an undocumented suggestion. For example,
the testimony is made specifically for the nonobviousness inquiry. Its
conclusion, therefore, may be driven by the desire for a particular
outcome.321
The rule of evidence aspect to the suggestion test attempts to
graft some reliability safeguards into evidence of an undocumented
suggestion. The rule requires testimony to contain detail and
analysis. The testimony must detail the general knowledge in the art
or the nature of the problem being solved and then explain why such
information creates a suggestion to combine or modify the prior art
to practice the invention.322 Mere argumentation or conclusory
statements of undocumented suggestion cannot form the basis of a
finding of suggestion.323 The USPTO cannot simply assert that, for
example, those of skill in the art know that conventional memory is
better than bit map memory and are likely to substitute one for the
other.324 This statement, standing by itself, is tough to evaluate for
its truthfulness. More information as to why this fact is known to
those of skill in the art is needed. In addition, some reasoning as to
why that person would swap these types of memory would lend
more credence to the statements ultimate conclusion of suggestion.
The requirement for a detailed analysis is a proxy to ensure the
testimony’s contents are reliable.325 When the testifier explains in
320. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (touting the use of dictionaries in interpreting patent claims because they are
“unbiased” and “not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to . . . the grant of
the patent, not colored by motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation”). The
understanding of prior art can be influenced by that information which is inherent to one of
ordinary skill in the art. See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (explaining the concept of inherency). However, the information is still grounded in the
fixed, documentary evidence that makes up prior art.
321. Cf. Tex. Digital Sys., 308 F.3d at 1202–03.
322. See supra Part V.A.
323. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 742–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
324. See id.
325. See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, 407 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(detailing the expert’s testimony).
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detail why a conclusion of suggestion was reached, that conclusion
has a higher likelihood of being true. The required additional
reasoning will either further flesh out a testifier’s conclusion
regarding an undocumented suggestion or exclude, or deter, a
testifier from reaching an incorrect conclusion on suggestion.
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence operates in a similar
fashion to Daubert requirements for the admission of expert
testimony. Ensuring reliability is the goal of the admissibility
requirements governing expert testimony.326 To meet this goal,
courts are required to resolve, as a threshold matter, whether the
methodology an expert uses to reach a particular conclusion is sound
enough to deem the conclusion reliable.327 Testimony from experts
whose methodologies are considered flawed are unreliable and, thus,
inadmissible. This lack of reliability suggests that the conclusions are
more likely false than true.328 Because there is presumed systematic
overvaluation of expert testimony by factfinders, the judicial system
cannot risk admitting unreliable expert evidence if the system’s goal
is to maximize the likelihood of finding truth.329
Testimony regarding a suggestion to combine from general
knowledge or the nature of the problem does not necessarily rise to
the level of expert testimony. Such testimony can come from fact
witnesses. But the testimony’s contents and the question the
testimony addresses raise similar concerns of overvaluation as expert
testimony. The testimony addresses a factual issue with which a
factfinder is most likely unfamiliar—whether, in a given technological
field, a person having a certain level of training in that technology
would have been motivated to combine or modify what had already
been done to create the patent invention.330 The question of a

326. See Friedman, supra note 275, at 2049–50; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting
Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of
Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1735 (2001).
327. The current focus is on ensuring the methodology the expert uses to reach her
conclusions is sound. See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the
Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just
the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13–18 (discussing the Daubert
trilogy). Caudill and LaRue conclude that more than methodology should be considered when
testing the reliability, and thus the scientific correctness, of an expert’s testimony. Id. at 51–53.
328. See Friedman, supra note 275, at 2050.
329. See Kaye, supra note 285, at 1939–40 (explaining that jurors might give too much
weight to scientific evidence and, thus, hinder justice).
330. See supra Part II.B.
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suggestion is also very technical because of the nature of the
invention at issue.331 The factfinder, therefore, just as with an expert,
will need to rely heavily on the testimony regarding suggestion.
Because of unfamiliarity with the issues presented, the factfinder may
have a propensity for crediting the testimony in its entirety. Under
these circumstances, as with expert evidence, the reliability of the
evidence presented becomes extremely important. The suggestion
test’s rule of evidence reacts to this situation and, in turn, attempts
to ensure reliability by requiring detailed and thorough analysis for
testimony to be available for consideration.
The rule further tailors its assurances of reliability by tuning the
required detail and analysis of testimony on suggestion to the level of
technology at issue. As the complexity of technology increases, the
subject matter becomes increasingly unfamiliar to the factfinder. The
factfinder, accordingly, will increase their reliance on the testimony
on an undocumented suggestion. For example, a jury is more likely
to fully rely on testimony regarding a capillary electrophoresis device
than testimony on a splash pan.332 With this increase in reliance, the
fear of overvaluation and need for reliability grows.333 The rule
adjusts accordingly, requiring more detail for the testimony to be
admissible.
B. Rule’s Effect on the Correctness of Nonobviousness Decisions
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence reduces overvaluation of
suggestion evidence. But, for a complete normative evaluation of the
rule, the rule’s impact on substantive nonobviousness law needs to
be examined. By reducing overvaluation of suggestion evidence, the
rule helps the nonobviousness requirement to operate properly.
However, the rule, by definition, excludes some evidence of
undocumented suggestion from consideration, potentially
hampering one’s ability to challenge a patent claim’s
nonobviousness. The question becomes whether these substantive
effects of the suggestion test’s rule of evidence, on balance, maintain
or frustrate the balance between incentives and competition that the
nonobviousness doctrine is trying to preserve. To put it simply, does
331. See id.
332. Compare Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Bekman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332,
1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2005), with In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281, 282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
333. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 285, at 1939–40.
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the rule increase the likelihood that courts and the USPTO will
make correct determinations on nonobviousness? To better answer
this question, the following section examines the rule’s effect on
both Type I and Type II errors.
1. Rule reduces Type I errors
Type I errors occur when a court or the USPTO finds a patent
claim obvious when, in actuality, it is not.334 That is, the claimed
invention is found unpatentable even though it describes an
invention that is a significant technological advance over the prior art
and would not have been created absent the incentive of patent
protection.335 The suggestion test, when operating properly, does
not find a suggestion when these two conditions are present.336 The
problem, detailed above, is that evidence of an undocumented
suggestion has certain inherent attributes that lead to a finding of
suggestion when a suggestion is actually absent.337 These factors
create Type I errors because they cause suggestions to be found
where they are not, and these false suggestions lead to false
conclusions of obviousness.
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence reduces overvaluation of
suggestion evidence. As a result, the rule reduces the number of false
findings of suggestion, which in turn results in less false findings of
obviousness. Without a factual finding of suggestion, a court or the
USPTO cannot hold a patent claim invalid because of obviousness.
The rule, therefore, prevents possible Type I errors by increasing the
likelihood that suggestion findings are accurate. This evidentiary
aspect of the suggestion test helps to ensure the correctness of
determinations of obviousness.

334. See supra note 271.
335. See supra Part II.
336. See supra Part II.B.
337. A factfinder or testifier, because of the hindsight bias, may find a suggestion when it
is, in truth, not present. A factfinder may also completely credit testimony supporting an
undocumented suggestion when, in reality, the testimony is unreliable and it is likely that the
suggestion does not exist.
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2. Rule fails to address and may create Type II errors
Type II errors occur when a court or the USPTO finds a patent
claim nonobvious when, in actuality, it is not.338 The suggestion
test’s rule of evidence does little to ensure the correctness of
determinations of nonobviousness. All of the evidentiary aspects of
the suggestion test discussed guard against the overvaluation of
evidence of obviousness. The rule ensures that evidence regarding an
undocumented suggestion is less susceptible to hindsight bias and
more reliable. But hindsight bias and the lack of reliability have only
a tendency to produce incorrect findings of obviousness. These
overvaluing effects do not operate in the other direction. They do
not have a propensity to improperly push the factfinder to a finding
of nonobviousness. The overvaluation the suggestion test’s rule of
evidence addresses is a one-way ratchet—making a finding of
obviousness more likely in those cases where the invention is truly
nonobvious. The elimination of overvaluation of suggestion evidence
does not address possible Type II errors.
In fact, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence may even introduce
Type II errors of its own. In practice, the rule may have the same, or
similar, effect as the narrow suggestion test because the rule
necessarily limits the scope of available evidence to prove an
undocumented suggestion. The rule also introduces costs, by
requiring more detail and analysis, that can further limit the ability
for litigants, the USPTO, and other patent observers to avail
themselves of undocumented suggestions to evaluate and invalidate
patent claims.
The rule of evidence increases the cost of challenging a patent in
litigation on obviousness grounds. The rule requires testimony that
includes detailed analysis. To get such testimony will require, in most
cases, the hiring of an expert. This expert will need to be paid for a
lengthy report and testimony in order to meet the requirements of
the suggestion test’s evidentiary rule. Litigants will either need to
devote significant resources to proving obviousness or will be
discouraged from bringing a challenge altogether because of the
costs imposed by the rule. These costs become even more significant
when patent observers—potential licenses or those in a pre-litigation
posture—want to evaluate a patent’s nonobviousness. Accessing,

338. See supra note 271.
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creating, and evaluating detailed analysis of an undocumented
suggestion in such situations produce litigation type costs in settings
where such costs are usually not expected, and, as a result, are even
more burdensome.
Barrier creating costs would also be experienced at the USPTO.
A patent examiner does not have the ability to produce detailed
testimony to support a finding of undocumented suggestion.339 The
USPTO does not have the resources or procedural tools through
which it can solicit testimony to establish what was generally known
to a particular art field. The rule would thus result in a de facto
narrow suggestion test at the USPTO.
This lack of availability of undocumented suggestions would lead
to incorrect findings of nonobviousness. In technological areas
where suggestions are unlikely to be fixed and available on paper,
such as the software and business method areas, access to
undocumented suggestions is necessary to properly determine
whether inventions in the technologies are truly nonobvious.340
Undocumented suggestions also allow the nonobviousness
requirement to operate properly where well-known principles and
concepts are not memorialized.341 Without the undocumented
suggestion categories, inventions that were obvious at the time of
their creation will still be held nonobvious due to the lack of
documented evidence of suggestion.342 A Type II error is therefore
introduced—a finding of nonobviousness when the invention is
actually obvious. The rule of evidence, by de facto limiting access to
undocumented suggestions, may produce Type II errors.
The barriers created by the suggestion test’s rule of evidence are
a little overstated, particularly in the litigation setting. First, the rule
does not go as far as the narrow suggestion test because the rule
does not completely change the substantive part of the suggestion
test. A suggestion to combine can still be based on an
undocumented suggestion—general knowledge in the art or the
nature of the problem being solved.343 Prior art is not the only
source for suggestion. Evidence to establish an undocumented
339. See Rai, supra note 94, at 912–17.
340. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 88–90.
341. See id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 40.
342. Id.; Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 888.
343. See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, 407 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also supra Part III.
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suggestion does need to meet the detail and analysis required under
the rule. But, unlike the narrow suggestion test, establishing an
undocumented suggestion is still possible. The general parameters of
the broad suggestion test are not disturbed.
Additionally, in the litigation setting, the added requirement of
detail and analysis from a testifier on an undocumented suggestion
adds minimal costs. Patent litigations cost, on average, about
$800,000 for each party through the end of discovery and about
$1,500,000 for each party through trial and appeal.344 Also, the
usage of experts in patent litigation by both parties on issues of
infringement and validity is ubiquitous.345 In light of the overall high
cost of litigation and required hiring and use of experts, the addition
of some detail and analysis from one of those experts is minimal at
best. Those situations where a litigant is deterred from pursuing an
obviousness theory based on an undocumented suggestion because
of the rule would most likely not be Type II error situations. Instead,
that litigant is already deterred by the costs of patent litigation in
general or, in reality, no undocumented suggestion exists.
Otherwise, a litigant should easily be able to use an expert who can
add detail and analysis to their testimony to meet the rule’s
requirements.
Outside the litigation setting, the full and complete discussion of
any issue of infringement or validity is also expensive. A reliable legal
opinion on a patent’s validity or infringement may cost tens of
thousands of dollars and can, in certain circumstances, cost well over
$100,000.346 Again, the additional costs associated with the rule are
likely minimal in comparison. In addition, the rule has the benefit of
forcing a patent observer to come to terms with the substance of the
possible undocumented suggestion. Requiring some detail and
analysis allows the observer to better test the strength of a patent’s
nonobviousness.

344. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 16 (2005) (citing AIPLA Report of Economic Survey (of U.S. IP Practitioners) (1999)).
345. See Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 3 (1999) (stating that patent litigation “dictate[s] that expert testimony is virtually
essential in assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence and to resolve factual issues in
litigation”).
346. See, e.g., Edwin H. Taylor & Gleen E. Von Tersch, A Proposal To Shore Up the
Foundations of Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 721, 740 (1998).
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In the patent office setting, the USPTO does have avenues for
producing admissible “evidence.” Patent examiners can, by rule,
provide an affidavit describing “the facts within the personal
knowledge of an employee of the [USPTO].”347 Patent examiners
can also request evidence to substantiate an undocumented
suggestion from the applicant.348 And the case law does not require
detailed analysis to come in the form of testimony via an affidavit or
declaration. Cases such as Lee and Beasley simply call for the USPTO
to “articulate[] and place[] on the record” any knowledge they may
rely upon to “negate patentability.”349 “Testimony” can consist of a
statement made by the examiner or Board. For the testimony to be
admissible, it must be detailed and set forth the pertinent analysis.
Even in those instances where the rule of evidence may call for more
detail and analysis, the USPTO has the tools to create “admissible”
evidence without too much administrative burden.
Furthermore, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence is tailored to
minimize costs in those instances where the fear of overvaluation is
small. As the invention’s technological complexity decreases, so does
the stringency of the rule’s requirements.350 Thus, the simpler the
technology at issue, the lower the costs on those trying to prove the
invention is obvious. This lessening of the standard for admissibility
coincides with those circumstances where hindsight bias is not as
strong and the factfinder can better test the reliability of the
testimony on their own.351 These are also the instances where critics
see the highest likelihood for Type II errors. Simple technological
areas, such as business method invention, and information so well
known in an industry it is not documented are the areas where
commentators believe the reliance on undocumented suggestions is
most needed.352 In these situations, the rule of evidence’s
requirement for detail will be at its lowest, and thus the costs the rule
creates will also be low. The rule’s balancing between the detail and

347. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(d)(2) (2004) (“[The] data shall be as specific as possible.”).
348. See id. § 1.105(a)(1) (indicating that the examiner may request “information as may
be reasonably necessary to properly examine”).
349. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also In re Beasley, 117 F.
App’x 739, 743–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
350. See supra Part V.B.
351. See supra Part VI.A.
352. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 40 (discussing the need for
undocumented suggestions to properly determine a business method’s nonobviousness).
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analysis required compared to the difficulty of technology at issue
addresses the concerns of the ability to prove an obvious invention
obvious.
This sliding scale aspect of the rule will also make it easier for the
USPTO to establish obviousness in those simple technological cases.
Both Battiston and Nylen are perfect examples of this facet of the
rule in action. In both cases, the USPTO offered only rather terse
analysis as to why general knowledge in the art or the nature of the
problem being solved provided a suggestion to combine the prior art
to make the applied-for invention.353 This was enough because the
technology at issue was simple.
With all of this being said, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence
could be modified to prevent Type II errors. In particular, the rule’s
requirements could be relaxed in the USPTO setting. Under such a
relaxation, courts would consider more undocumented suggestions
admissible for a given level of technological complexity when the
issue of obviousness is being decided by the USPTO. Put another
way, the “rule” depicted in Figure 1 would be adjusted downward,
increasing the area of “admissible” evidence of suggestion.
While the office has access to detailed and thorough testimony,
such access is not as readily available as in the litigation setting. In
addition, the time and monetary resources are just not present at the
USPTO to fully flesh out undocumented suggestions in all cases
where such suggestions are truly present, but the suggestion test’s
rule of evidence cannot be met. Finally, the fear of creating Type I
errors is less in the USPTO setting because the factfinder—the
examiner—is experienced in the relevant technical field. They are,
thus, better equipped to avoid hindsight and question the reliability
of technical evidence themselves.354
Furthermore, these Type II errors in the examination process can
be particularly harmful because such errors cause the nonobviousness
standard to be ineffective at the beginning of the patent process. For
the system to work properly, obvious patents should not issue from
the USPTO. When they do, the social costs are high because the
patented invention’s obviousness can only be established through
353. See In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281, 283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Nylen, 97 F.
App’x 293, 294 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
354. Because of the factfinder’s sophistication and familiarity with technical information,
even reliable scientific evidence is more likely to be properly valued because the factfinder has
the tools to perform this evaluation on their own.
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litigation and the overcoming of the presumption of validity.355
Relaxing the suggestion test’s rule of evidence just a little can help
minimize Type II errors at this very early stage of the patent process.
These reductions of errors come at a cost savings by reducing the
burden of evidence production on examiners.
C. Need for Express Adoption of the Rule
As mentioned previously, one of the strongest possible critiques
against this Article’s findings is that the Federal Circuit is not
consciously implementing the rule as described. The nonobviousness
cases over the three year period study just happen to support the
Article’s descriptive findings. Put another way, the descriptive
analysis in this Article is merely outcome determinative, where the
cases are characterized in such a way to support the rule being
discussed. The argument would be that the judges at the Federal
Circuit never intended to create an evidentiary side to the suggestion
test, and it is unlikely the rule will hold true in future cases decided
by the court.
Such a critique is valid. As previously noted, the court never
explicitly articulated the rule described in this Article. The rule, in
the Federal Circuit’s mind, may not truly exist. This possibility
reduces the power behind the descriptive part of this study.
Something was “found” that is not really there.
The normative analysis, however, suggests that even if such a rule
does not exist, it should—at least in the proposed modified form.
Courts should consciously graft an evidentiary aspect to the
suggestion test because doing so has many benefits. The rule reduces
Type I errors, guarding against overvaluation, such as from
hindsight, in the nonobviousness analysis. The rule, particularly if
modified as this Article suggests by relaxing the rule in the USPTO
setting, does not create many Type II errors and still allows
undocumented suggestions to be considered in most cases. Because
of this, the Federal Circuit, or better yet the Supreme Court in

355. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1149 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (citing State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057,
1067 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The result is that bad patents are issued. Cf. Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495–97 (2001) (arguing
that there should not be so much focus on ensuring that all patents issued are truly valid).
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Teleflex, should expressly articulate the evidentiary-like part of the
suggestion test.
Even if the Federal Circuit is conscious of the evidentiary aspect
of the suggestion test, express adoption by the Supreme Court or the
Federal Circuit has its own benefits. Expressly setting forth the rule
would answer much of the recent criticism arguing that only
documented suggestions can prove obviousness. In addition, the
transparency would make it easier for all patent observers to evaluate
nonobviousness questions. Lower courts and the USPTO would
know the law under which their nonobviousness decisions will be
reviewed, and other patent observers could better evaluate a patent’s
potential invalidity.
VII. VIEWING OTHER PATENT LAW DOCTRINES THROUGH AN
EVIDENTIARY LENS
The evidentiary focus of this Article, while directly contributing
to the current discourse on the nonobviousness requirement, can
also prove useful in the examination of other patent doctrines. In
particular, an evidentiary lens has both descriptive and normative
powers. First, the operation of other traditionally substantive areas of
patent law can be better understood when looked at through an
evidentiary lens. Once the descriptive benefits of the evidentiary lens
are realized, the normative part of the lens can help fully evaluate
these patent doctrines. The use of evidence theory facilitates the
complete evaluation of areas of patent law that have evidentiary
facets.
To provide an example of the use of the evidentiary lens beyond
nonobviousness, two other substantive areas of patent law are briefly
discussed: claim interpretation and inventorship. Both have
evidentiary-like aspects that, when identified as such, give a fuller
understanding to the two doctrines. In addition, the development of
both doctrines can benefit from being evaluated under the evidence
law goal of maximizing the likelihood of correct factual
determinations.
A. Claim Interpretation
The first area of patent law that benefits from an evidentiary lens
is patent claim interpretation. Patent claim interpretation is the
process in which a court gives meaning to claim terms in order to
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better define the invention being covered, thereby clarifying the
scope of exclusivity.356 Claim interpretation is an essential first step in
almost all patent inquiries—particularly validity and infringement.357
While the main thrust of claim interpretation is substantive,358
the concept of evidence plays a significant role. For starters, the
Federal Circuit categorizes the various interpretative sources as either
“intrinsic evidence” or “extrinsic evidence.” Intrinsic evidence are
those information sources unique to the patent claim being
construed, while extrinsic evidence are sources that are independent
of the claim. A major portion of claim interpretation jurisprudence
focuses on when either of these sources may be used by a court when
construing a claim. In general, the use of intrinsic evidence is favored
over that of extrinsic evidence.359 This preference is traditionally
justified on public notice grounds.360
The choice can also be viewed as being driven by evidentiary
concerns.361 Extrinsic evidence usually comes in the form of expert
356. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961)
(“[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant . . . .” (citing Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944))).
357. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996); TI Group
Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[The] validity analysis is a two-step procedure: ‘The first step involves the proper
interpretation of the claims. The second step involves determining whether the limitations of
the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art.’” (quoting Beachcombers, Int’l,
Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
358. See Cotropia, supra note 193, at 65–69 (explaining that one of claim interpretation’s
main functions is to substantively define the patent’s scope).
359. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In
general, extrinsic evidence can only be used to define claim terms when a claim’s meaning
remains ambiguous after consulting all three forms of intrinsic evidence. Id. at 73–74; see also
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
360. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (“[C]ompetitors are entitled to review the public
record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s
claimed invention, and thus design around the claimed invention . . . . Allowing the public
record to be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert
testimony, would make this right meaningless.”).
361. The Federal Circuit has attempted to take an evidentiary view before, but got
caught up in the procedural devices surrounding technical rules of evidence. See Pitney Bowes,
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the court,
while disfavoring the usage of extrinsic evidence, has “not set forth any rules regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony into evidence”).
In a way, the evidentiary-like properties of claim interpretation are similar to those
of the suggestion test. The court is not using them to deny the actual admissibility of
disfavored evidence. Instead, the court simply instructs that one cannot “rely” on certain kinds
of evidence. See id. (explaining that “it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence” in certain
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testimony or inventor testimony.362 This testimony is created
specifically for the question of claim interpretation at hand. Because
of the testimony’s time of creation and the testifier’s relation to one
of the litigation parties, the testimony may be “colored by the
motives of the parties” or “inspired by litigation.”363 These concerns
are evidentiary ones. There is a worry about the veracity of such
extrinsic evidence, and thus, it is usually not considered. While a
concern for public notice justifies extrinsic evidence’s exclusion,
recognition of evidentiary concerns provides a fuller story. In
addition, once this evidentiary-like aspect to claim interpretation is
identified, it may be tweaked to maximize its truth maximization
purpose. For example, the recent debate over the consideration of
certain types of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, would have
been better informed if an evidentiary angle would have also been
fully considered.364
B. Inventorship
The concept of inventorship in patent law can also be viewed
through an evidentiary lens. Patent law, in general, awards a patent
to the first party to invent the claimed invention.365 The concept of
invention is, however, not that simple—particularly when two parties
claim to be the first to invent. The “priority of invention goes to the
first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party
can show that it was the first to conceive of the invention and that it

circumstances). The doctrine is still operating in an evidentiary-like fashion, it is just not using
an explicit rule of evidence.
362. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
363. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting
that “extrinsic evidence consisting of expert reports and testimony is generated at the time of
and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic
evidence,” and that this “bias can be exacerbated if the expert is not one of skill in the relevant
art or if the expert’s opinion is offered in a form that is not subject to cross-examination”);
Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(discussing what sets dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises apart from expert testimony).
364. Texas Digital started this part of the discussion, noting that dictionaries are insulated
from biases that may damage other expert evidence such as expert testimony. Tex. Digital, 308
F.3d at 1202–03. Whether this is the case or not was never fleshed out by the Federal Circuit
or commentators. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–23. Instead, the focus was more on the
inclusion of dictionaries impact on public notice, certainty, the substantive claim scope, or
information costs. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 193, at 102–16 (demonstrating that even the
author failed to recognize the evidentiary lens).
365. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
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exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to
practice.”366 Thus, inventorship depends on a finding of conception
and a reduction to practice.367
While the concept of inventorship is heavily substantive, focusing
on mental and actual incarnations of a working invention, the
doctrine also has an evidentiary side. If an inventor testifies to her
own conception or reduction to practice, that testimony must be
corroborated to establish inventorship.368 Uncorroborated testimony
by the inventor cannot, by itself, establish inventorship.369 Some
independent evidence, which can be circumstantial, must support the
inventor’s testimony for a court or the USPTO to even consider
whether inventorship has been established.370 The requirement for
corroboration, therefore, creates an evidentiary-like rule that
mandates a certain type of evidence be presented—corroborating
evidence—before a decision maker can even consider making a
substantive determination as to whether they are an inventor or not.
Using an evidentiary lens not only better describes the
corroboration requirement, but it also more accurately identifies the
purpose of the requirement. Corroboration is required because the
“inventor may have a motive to assert his claim in a self-serving
manner.”371 Demanding corroboration before the substantive inquiry

366. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Price v. Symsek,
988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
367. “Conception is the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention . . . .’” See Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Coleman v. Dines,
754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Reduction to practice can either be constructive, via the
filing of a patent application, or actual. Id.; Michael F. Ciraolo, Application of the
Corroboration Requirement to Interference Proceedings and Other Sections of 102, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 531, 532 (2002). Actual reduction to practice entails creating an
embodiment that includes all the limitations of the patent claim and recognizing that the
embodiment works for its intended purpose. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d
647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Ciraolo, supra, at 532.
368. Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330; Ciraolo, supra note 367, at 532–33.
369. See Allen v. Blaisdell, 196 F.2d 527, 529 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (noting that the
requirement of corroboration “is inviolable and the tribunals of the Patent Office and the
courts may not depart from it”).
370. See Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (discussing the “rule of reason” that applies to
circumstantial evidence that may corroborate an inventor’s testimony as to actual reduction to
practice); Horton v. Stephens, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245, 1248 (B.P.A.I. 1988) (noting that
“independent evidence” is needed for corroboration).
371. Ciraolo, supra note 367, at 532.
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begins “prevent[s] fraud and dishonesty.”372 The evidentiary-like
corroboration rule was created to more reliably establish the
credibility of the inventor’s testimony.373 Corroboration and the
rules of evidence have similar goals—maximizing the likelihood of
correct determinations. The inventorship case law has concluded that
the potential for a possible inventor to lie about her own
inventorship is so high that even testimony a factfinder may find
credible by itself is not enough to legally establish inventorship. The
testimony, in other words, has a high likelihood to be unreliable, and
thus, the courts inject reliability by requiring the presentation of
corroborating evidence before the issue of inventorship is handed
over to the factfinder. This evidentiary look at inventorship and
corroboration can prove extremely helpful in developing the specific
requirements for corroboration.374 Since corroboration is an
evidentiary creature, what is properly considered corroboration is
better defined with the aid of evidence theory.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The descriptive study performed in this Article explains an
apparent conflict in Federal Circuit nonobviousness law. The notion
of a truly narrow suggestion test is dismissed, and an evidentiary-like
aspect of the suggestion test is identified and described. This Article
furthers its evidence focus through its examination of the suggestion
test’s rule of evidence. The rule clearly reduces erroneous findings of
obviousness, but, in its current formulation, does little to diminish,
and may even exacerbate, the potential for erroneous findings of
nonobviousness. With a little tweaking, specifically lowering the
standard in the USPTO context, the suggestion test’s rule of
evidence can be an even more potent tool for properly implementing
the nonobviousness requirement and maintaining the balance
between incentivizing invention and furthering competition. Because
of these benefits, the Supreme Court in Teleflex should expressly

372. Id. at 532–33.
373. Id. at 532–34 (discussing the use of the “‘rule of reason’ analysis to determine if
testimony given by a witness or documentary evidence support the claims made by the
inventor”).
374. Currently, the courts adopt a “rule of reason” approach to “determine whether an
inventor’s testimony . . . has been sufficiently corroborated.” Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (citing
Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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articulate the rule of evidence aspect of the suggestion test described
in this Article.
In addition, the use of an evidentiary lens has benefits beyond
the nonobviousness doctrine. Other areas of patent law, such as
claim interpretation and inventorship, can benefit from evidence
theory. An evidentiary lens helps explain the procedural-like aspects
of some patent doctrines and prompts a better appreciation of a
doctrine’s operation. Furthermore, the normative concepts in
evidence law can aid in the evaluation and shaping of other parts of
patent law. As a result, courts and commentators should look to
apply evidentiary principles outside the context of the
nonobviousness doctrine.
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